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Homeland security is evolving. Past and current linear approaches to preparedness 
do not focus on improving the “resilience” of an area post-recovery. Most preparation 
efforts do not address or consider the high number of small business owners failing due 
to lack of planning, even though small businesses are sometimes as much as half of the 
economic life of any given area. To address these challenges, a holistic approach 
establishes multiple sectors of preparedness.  
This thesis explores the advantages of a wrap-around services model (similar to a 
business incubator) to provide entrepreneurs with tools and resources to withstand 
disaster. Case studies and best practices identify and inform models of preparedness, 
including community asset mapping, scenario planning, and social network analysis for 
capacity building within Anytown, USA, when facing natural or man-made disasters.  
This approach engages entrepreneurs and coordinates already existing models and 
resources into a cost-effective community asset, since every dollar spent on mitigation 
saves four dollars in the event of a disaster. Successful response models mobilize support 
for a more resilient nation, community by community.  
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As the United States repeatedly learns the hard way, most communities are 
unprepared for the disasters that they experience. Some communities are unprepared even 
for predictable, recurring adverse events, such as heavy snow in New England. Small 
businesses, which rely on foot traffic (or passable main and side roads, for customer 
access and deliveries) usually suffer serious losses.  
Everyone shares those losses. In a thirty-year period, the economic impact of 
natural disasters in the United States increased from $528 billion to $1,213 billion.1 
During the 2000 to 2009 period, 385 disasters occurred, an increase of 233 percent since 
1980–89.2 
Entrepreneurs, the putative “backbone” of the U.S. economy, are mostly 
unprepared for any kind of disaster or any significant business disruption. Those who 
have taken some measures, nevertheless, tend to be underprepared.  
This lack of preparedness represents a significant peril of potential pain to the 
overall national economic and social vitality. Small businesses account for more than 
twenty-eight million small businesses in the United States, creating two of every three net 
jobs while employing half of America’s workforce.  
Many intriguing questions are raised by the research that has been conducted, and 
more research is needed in many areas. Considerable strides have been made in 
examining the problems and successes in previous disasters. Efforts lag in mobilizing 
public policy and preparedness initiatives. Many people, including those in positions of 
responsibility, have an irrational resistance to the contemplation necessary for 
preparation.  
                                                 
1 Kunreuther Howard and Michel-Kerjan Erwann, “Challenge Paper: Natural Disasters,” Center for 
Risk Management and Decision Processes The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, April 12, 
2012, http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/CopenhagenConsenus2012_NaturalDistasters.pdf. 
2 Ban Wei Xinhua, “Study Shows Dramatic Rise in Natural Disasters over Past Decade,” SINA 
English, January 2010, http://english.sina.com/technology/p/2010/0128/302222.html. 
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Yet, in the event of a disaster, the cavalry is not coming quickly. The National 
Response Plan’s assumption is that communities will be self-sustaining for at least 72 
hours after a disaster impact. In some cases, the cavalry is not coming at all. Only about 
one percent of disasters receive presidential disaster declarations.  
Consequently, a lot of misinformation and “wishful thinking” is found among the 
public in general and entrepreneurs in particular. Overall, regardless of educational level 
or income, people fail to understand that at some point a disaster will happen near them. 
As a near-certain consequence of that failure, they are stunned, rather than effective, in 
response. These cognitive distortions highlight an apparent collective difficulty for 
people to perceive risk appropriately, especially risks associated with natural disasters, a 
phenomenon quite challenging in adjustment.  
By contrast, engaged communities build capacity before disaster strikes. For 
every $1 spent in mitigation, the return on value for being prepared is $4. Safety on a 
shoestring is somewhere between impractical and impossible. A defensive, re-active 
policy misses strategic opportunities in the remaining areas of mitigation, response, and 
recovery. Most disaster planning in the United States is still reactive. The great added 
value of mitigation is that its activities are in tandem with lessons from prior incidents. 
After studying multiple disasters and responses with respect to entrepreneurial 
resilience, this writer recommends a number of initiatives to mitigate the losses of 
communities in general and small businesses in particular. Principally, the “lessons 
learned” and “best practices” resources available from multiple federal sources clearly 
indicate a wrap-around business incubator approach that informs guided scenario 
planning and resource inventory. The writer chose the term “hat trick approach” to 
describe the combination of community asset mapping, social network analysis and 
scenario planning. While these terms have a certain intimidating quality, they represent 
transferable skills, and these skills are a vital part of an effective recovery from an 
adverse event. Furthermore, the components of the “hat trick” are all readily available 
products. Federal agencies have tutorials available to enhance the preparedness and 
disaster management cycle, and therefore, to enhance any given community’s resilience.  
 xv 
Emergency response has to manage any chaos that occurs. Scenario planning was 
designed for just this purpose; however, community asset mapping has value far beyond 
disaster relief. Social network analysis is an evolving and promising field with multiple 
applications, especially in public safety. These applications are intriguing, and in many 
cases, already-proven methods of increasing safety and reducing injuries and fatalities. 
It appears possible to ameliorate some of the extraordinary expenses, losses, 
injuries, and frustrations associated with disasters by using inclusive, holistic, and 
flexible approaches to guide the formation of public/private partnerships with a pro-
active, rather than reactive approach. An authentic dialogue within a community can be 
an excellent first step towards an effective mitigation strategy. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis explores the following question: How can jurisdictions leverage 
technological and community resources to decrease the failure rate of small business 
entrepreneurs through education and wrap-around services? 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Society has become more of a global marketplace growing in complexity where 
systems are linked. Then, those systems are linked to more systems. Complexity abounds, 
and new fields of mathematical interpretation have attempted to explain various events, 
as the links behave in unexpected ways. These links can exacerbate supply chain 
disruptions on a large scale.1 These links, when disrupted, can have fatal consequences, 
tragic in their avoidability. Examining one example, in 2003 the Station nightclub in 
West Warwick Rhode Island revived an era of irresponsible recreation facility fatality 
and remains the fourth worst nightclub fire in U.S. history.2 Unapproved pyrotechnics 
ignited unapproved soundproofing and then ignited the entire club. One hundred people 
were killed, and many survivors were severely wounded. That link is not complex. 
Neither is the largest threat to property, economic stability, and communities: disasters. 
Consider that in a thirty-year period, the economic impact of natural disasters has 
increased from $528 billion (1981–1990) to $1,197 billion (1991–2000) to $1,213 billion 
(2001–2010),3 and it is estimated that economic losses in the United States reached $1 
billion per week and $10 billion per week in the world.4 It is beyond the scope of this 
                                                 
1 Arjen Boin, “Disaster Research and Future Crises: Broadening the Research Agenda,” International 
Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 23, no. 3 (2005): 199–214. 
2 Seth Cline, “A Decade Later, Nightclub Fire Lives on: No Nightclub Blaze Rivaling the Station Fire 
Has Occurred in the United States Since,” US World News, February 20, 2013, sec. Press Past. 
3 Kunreuther Howard and Michel-Kerjan Erwann, “Challenge Paper: Natural Disasters,” Center for 
Risk Management and Decision Processes The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, April 12, 
2012, http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/CopenhagenConsenus2012_NaturalDistasters.pdf. 
4 Hilary Inyang, Terezinha Cassia de Brito Galvão, and David Young, “Integrating Hazard Control 
into Sustainable Development Plans,” Natural Hazards Review 4, no. 2 (2003): 57–58. 
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paper to predict whether the prevalence of disasters continues to increase. Inyang et al. 
posit that human activity, including an increase in population density and migration to 
vulnerable areas, are more plausible causes.5 Notwithstanding the macro-scale control 
that such perspectives necessitate, the planning scale alone is in the decades. 
Communities taking proactive approaches reduce vulnerability through more holistic 
approaches. Approaches that assess levels of risk, and suggest effective and efficient 
mitigation can bend an increasing cost curve.  
In 2011, Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8): National Preparedness was 
drafted to strengthen the resilience of the nation, and optimize resources through National 
Planning Frameworks covering the preparedness mission areas (prevention, protection, 
mitigation, response, and recovery).6 The Frameworks are considered living policy 
guidance and link public safety with economic development, describing how the “Whole 
Community works together to achieve a resilient nation.”7  
The National Mitigation Framework in particular uses a proactive bilateral 
approach in which government addresses the real weakness; a lack of planning that puts 
property and people at risk. Simultaneously, the National Mitigation Framework reduces 
the cost curve, since for every dollar spent in mitigation, its return on value is four.8 
Mitigation provides measured outcomes that reduce risk. During large-scale emergencies 
(such as Hurricanes Katrina or Sandy) needs will be unmet and the assumption from the 
National Response Plan is that communities will be self-sustaining for at least 72 hours 
after a disaster impact.  
                                                 
5 Inyang, Galvão, and Young, “Integrating Hazard Control into Sustainable Development Plans,” 57–
58. 
6 White House, “Presidential Policy Directive-8, National Preparedness,” accessed October 8, 2014, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1215444247124.shtm. 
7 Ibid. 
8 House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Subcommittee on Economic Development, 
Public Buildings, and Emergency Management. Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Pre-Disaster 
Mitigation Grant Program, 110th Congress (2008); Federal Emergency Management Agency, “What is 
Mitigation?” Department of Homeland Security, accessed April, 15, 2014, https://www.fema.gov/what- 
mitigation. 
 3 
Through the emergency management phases, the alignment of policy and 
implementation has been a key challenge. Despite governmental doctrine highlighting the 
importance of integrating the private sector, 40 percent of small businesses never reopen 
after a disaster;9 another 25 percent fail within one year, and more than 90 percent of all 
businesses fail within two years after being struck by a disaster.10  
Furthermore, research suggests that most small business owners fail to develop 
disaster or contingency plans. The problem is not a lack of public awareness 
campaigns,11 although public relations are an essential element of any policy strategy. 
Effectiveness of any given public relations strategy is bound to have some influence on 
the outcome. While in most jurisdictions big business are part of the preparedness efforts, 
and despite the integration of local chambers of commerce (representing small business), 
federal directives are not adequately propagated. Clearly, the number of small businesses 
failing relative to the current efforts trying to raise awareness among small business 
owners speaks to the urgency of the need for emergency planning.12 Thus when disasters 
occur, small business are overdetermined - to be critically underprepared.  
As part of this research, the writer explores alternative strategies underlying some 
of the practices utilized with small business incubators pre- and post-recovery, as well as 
a wrap-around services support structure. Adapting some of the features of the 
entrepreneur community/perspective to guidance within the national preparedness goal 
truly has the potential to engage small business owners in a more holistic approach 
involving the entire government in the reestablishment of the recovery and post-recovery 
economy. After all, an incubator model, deployed post-recovery, is similar to the startup 
level in comprising a team, limited assets, plenty of obstacles, but also an awareness of 
                                                 
9 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Protecting Your Business,” Department of Homeland 
Security, last updated June 15, 2015, http://www.fema.gov/protecting-your-businesses. 
10 Corina Mullen, “Business Planning for Disaster Survival,” Chamber101.com, accessed August 24, 
2013, http://www.chamber101.com/2programs_committee/natural_disasters/disasterpreparedness/Forty. 
htm. 
11 Ibid.; Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Business Continuity Plan,” accessed January 31, 
2014, http://www.ready.gov/business/implementation/continuity. 
12 Albert Sligh, Disaster Recovery: Evaluating the Role of America’s Small Business in Rebuilding 
Their Communities (Washington, DC: Senate Hearing 112-722, 2011), 7–9. 
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the importance of the intangible, such as morale. Any effort requires much of what is 
called “chivvying” in the United Kingdom (UK), (acknowledging the repetition that is 
sometimes necessary and always helpful) to maintain a collective impetus and the desire 
to build something.  
Entrepreneurs, in a linguistic sense, are “undertakers.” Without the morbid 
connotations otherwise associated with “undertaking,” a thoughtful and significant 
activity is conceived. The activity is defined with a goal of economic success. 
Entrepreneurs create value by perceiving profitability and envisioning different 
alternatives to problems. Likewise, small businesses usually find ways to engage with 
local governments. The speakeasy of yesteryear (in the United States, the 1920s) is now a 
responsible taxpayer, employer, or member of the local chamber of commerce. The 
liquor and brewing industries provide thousands of jobs inside the United States, 
although those jobs were defined as crimes less than a 100 years ago. What was the 
“underworld’s” economic advantage to provide, is now simply in the category of 
“undertaking” to access an economic opportunity. 
If successful, this proposed model has the potential to ease the shock of a disaster; 
stakeholders are more prepared, and the public is at least aware that preparations have 
been made. Also, any inherent tension between providing adequate resources, assisting 
those involved in preparedness, mitigation, and recovery can be greatly reduced by 
intelligent engagement with community involvement in disaster anticipation. Engaged 
communities build capacity before the next disaster strikes; amplifying their voices 
beyond their current representation. Emphasized inclusive preparation may enhance the 
nation’s resilience and responsiveness, while offering alternative economic options via 
private means in light of potentially diminishing state and federal resources. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Engagement of the private sector seems to be an ongoing theme gaining more 
prominence; however, a more holistic approach is shaped by entrepreneurship and 
mitigation principles, as well as the emergence of contingency planning (business 
continuity management and emergency management) as an evolving discipline. This 
 5 
review examines small business engagement (or the lack thereof) with respect to 
developing federal policy. The writer’s emphasis is on economic recovery and resilience. 
From the literature review, key insights are developed concerning the need for further 
research into enhancing the post-disaster resilience of small business entrepreneurs.  
1. Growing Cost and Vulnerability 
Resilience to natural disasters appears possible at times, and much more 
challenging at others. Although the 1990s were labeled by the United Nations as the 
“international decade for natural disaster reduction,” the growing cost of natural disasters 
continues to climb with devastating results. Consider that in 1995 the costliest disaster on 
record was the earthquake in Kobe, Japan with a price tag between US$110 to $150 
billion dollars, and that by 2006, the economic impacts of natural disasters worldwide 
were estimated to be US$800 billion.13  
Moreover, in a thirty-year period, the economic impact of natural disasters 
increased from $528 billion (1981–1990) to $1,197 billion (1991–2000) to $1,213 billion 
(2001–2010),14 and data from the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 
cites that “during the 2000 to 2009 period, there were 385 disasters, an increase of 233 
percent since 1980-89, and of sixty-seven percent since 1990 to 1999.”15 Although the 
economic impact of disasters can often be meliorated through insurance, studies suggest 
adverse selection.16  
 
 
                                                 
13 Stacey Menzel Baker, “Vulnerability and Resilience in Natural Disasters: A Marketing and Public 
Policy Perspective,” Journal of Public Policy and Marketing 28, no. 1 (2009): 114–123. 
14 Kunreuther Howard and Michel-Kerjan Erwann, “Challenge Paper: Natural Disasters,” Center for 
Risk Management and Decision Processes The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, April 12, 
2012, http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/CopenhagenConsenus2012_NaturalDistasters.pdf. 
15 Ban Wei Xinhua, “Study Shows Dramatic Rise in Natural Disasters over Past Decade,” SINA 
English, January 2010, http://english.sina.com/technology/p/2010/0128/302222.html. 
16 Michael K. Lindell, Ronald W. Perry, and Carla Prater, Introduction to Emergency Management 
(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2007), 180. 
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Also, “small businesses are particularly vulnerable to disasters because they often 
have small profit margins, they also typically lack adaptive business management 
models, tend to be underinsured, and often, depend on generating revenues from 
customers and clients who have also been impacted by the disaster.”17  
For municipalities, these effects are amplified through rippling impacts of adverse 
consequences, including decreased revenue in the form of sales, property, income taxes 
and user fees.18 Early figures from Hurricane Sandy (2012) surpassed the destruction and 
deadliest of Katrina (2005), with estimated economic losses around $65 billion.19 
Homeowners, business owners, and infrastructure owners were significantly affected 
across multiple states, with the largest devastation in metropolitan New York City and 
coastal New Jersey. An article published by the New York Daily News (one year after) 
cites more than 23,000 New York businesses with fewer than 50 employees (245,000 
individuals) were impacted by the Hurricane.20 Many businesses never reopened in the 
aftermath of Sandy; some never will. The situation is that severe economic implications 
are present when considering that small businesses in the United States maintain almost 
30 million positions, which creates two of every three net jobs that accounts for half of 
America’s workforce.21  
Damage to small business owners is particularly troubling because despite the 
financial losses “small businesses are the backbone of the nation.”22 The effects of 
damage permeate the psyches of many aspiring entrepreneurs and contribute to “social 
vulnerability” (the lack of social, economic, and political resources to address the impacts 
                                                 
17 Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy: Stronger 
Communities, A Resilient Region (Washington, DC: Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
2013), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=HSRebuildingStrategy.pdf. 
18 Lindell, Perry, and Prater, Introduction to Emergency Management, 165. 
19 “Deaths Associated with Hurricane Sandy—October–November 2012,” accessed October 4, 2013, 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6220a1.htm?s_cid=mm6220a1_w#fig. 
20 Phyllis Furman, “Hurricane Sandy, One Year Later: Businesses Struggle to Survive,” New York 
Daily News, 2013. 
21 SBA Office of Advocacy, “Brochure,” 2013, http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/WEB_ 
11_Advo_Brochure.pdf. 
22 Jared Hecht, “Are Small Businesses Really the Backbone of the Economy?” Inc.Com, December 
17, 2014. 
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of the disaster). “Social vulnerability is a measure of both the sensitivity of a population 
to natural hazards and its ability to respond to and recover from the impacts of hazard.”23  
Susan Cutter created a vulnerability assessment “Social Vulnerability Index” 
(sometimes called SoVI) extrapolating 40 years of research (1960 to 2000) to understand 
the interactions between the characteristics of individuals and social groups in response to 
the effects of natural hazards and their resilience. The SoVI captured 250 variables from 
U.S. census data to look for patterns of social vulnerability to natural hazards “based on 
the underlying socioeconomic and demographic profile.”24 The SoVI recorded a more 
detailed and nuance interpretation of the American experience, using a spatial structure. 
These changes to the American hazards composition of counties were initially 
concentrated in certain geographic areas but have spread.  
Moreover, the latest data from the 2010 census and the American Community 
Survey (2006–10) confirm the increase of risk areas and the expansion of vulnerability. 
Figure 1 provides a graphic depiction of the high, medium, and low areas in the country. 
  
                                                 
23 Susan Cutter, “Temporal and Spatial Changes to Social Vulnerability to Natural Hazards,” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105, no. 7 (2008): 2301–2306. 
24 Ibid. 
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Figure 1.  Social Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards 
 
Source: Susan Cutter, Christopher G. Burton, and Christopher T. Emrich, “Disaster 
Resilience Indicators for Benchmarking Baseline Conditions,” Journal of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management 7, no. 1, art. 51 (2010). 
For policy makers and practitioners, the underlying question is less “whether the 
pronounced impact of major disasters justifies federal policy guidance that includes small 
business” entrepreneurs as part of the entire homeland security calculus; the question is 
when the latter consensus reaches a critical mass, tipping point, or pivot. 
2. Hazard Assessments and Risk Reduction  
“Forewarning” shapes the way communities perceive natural risk, and subsequent 
protective actions are closely interrelated. Perry and Lindell argue that the emergency 
planning process when dealing with natural hazards is driven by both hazard assessment 
and risk reduction.25 Hazard assessment involves threats based on historical data and 
adjusting land use plans that often include a consequence analysis of risks to people and 
property. Social and economic factors can inform the probability of an occurrence. On 
                                                 
25 Ronald W. Perry and Michael K. Lindell, “Preparedness for Emergency Response: Guidelines for 
the Emergency Planning Process,” Disasters 27, no. 4 (2003): 336–350. 
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the other hand, risk reduction involves actions aimed at decreasing the actual or projected 
levels of threat and identifies resource capabilities. This combination allows jurisdictions 
to acquire some precision in threat measurement. Threat monitoring and evaluation is 
then (ideally, at least) expressed in clear outlines. Risk reduction is the development and 
implementation of activities focusing on mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
recovery.26  
At the local level, the hazard identification and risk assessment and consequence 
analysis are systematic ways in which communities are trying to buy down risk by using 
data-driven risk analysis procedures. At the state level, the threat hazard identification 
and risk assessment (THIRA) is being applied. In light of potential diminishing state and 
federal resources, expenditures on emergency management and homeland security related 
initiatives will necessitate more risk analysis to inform annual reports, investment 
justifications, legislative priorities, and day-to-day decisions.  
Furthermore, the THIRA process incorporates the whole community and the 
highest levels of local government to examine national level concerns, and state, local, 
and regional issues to determine a jurisdiction’s most significant threats and hazards. The 
process follows the steps prescribed by the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 201: “1) 
to identify the threats of concern, 2) give the threats and hazards context, 3) establish 
capability targets, 4) apply the results.”27 As a result, the THIRA provides a window of 
core capability targets for partners, public/private development of core capabilities 
among and including stakeholders usually excluded from emergency preparedness. This 
shift might mean that in certain areas, government involvement will be limited.  
For instance, if the capability target of community resilience is to develop a 
private/public integrated process to increase local multi-hazard mitigation plans, this 
adaptation could reduce long-term vulnerability. This push-and-pull continues identifying 
                                                 
26 Perry and Lindell, “Preparedness for Emergency Response: Guidelines for the Emergency Planning 
Process,” 339. 
27 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Threat Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment. 




risk through a multifactorial alignment. Thus, a comprehensive incorporation of local, 
state, and regional concerns includes economic development with the ultimate goal of 
enhancing community resilience. After all, “business as usual” means getting everyone, 
small businesses especially, “back to business.” Any local capacity to deal with the 
consequences of threats and hazards can be strengthened.  
3. The Disaster Management Cycle  
Lindell, Perry, and Prater, in Introduction to Emergency Management, trace the 
roots of the discipline from its evolution from civil defense (and a posture with a primary 
focus on response and recovery) rather than mitigation and preparedness.28 They argue 
that disasters, and particularly Hurricane Katrina, demonstrated the “flaw in this policy” 
and shifted attention to building community capacity by utilizing a “hazard management 
strategy” that combines a degree from all phases (mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
recovery). Similarly, Dane Egli in “Beyond Storms: Strengthening Preparedness, 
Response and Resilience in the 21st Century”, contends that the current reactionary 
posture in regards to disaster policy and grant guidance narrowly focuses on prevention 
and protection. A defensive, reactive policy misses strategic opportunities in the 
remaining areas of mitigation, response, and recovery.29  
Both these arguments point to flaws in the current conceptions, implementation, 
and development of disaster policy. However, what is a disaster? A review of the 
literature points to multiple definitions30 that will affect resource allocation and 
consequences.31 Nevertheless, it is important to underscore that only about 1 percent of 
                                                 
28 Lindell, Perry, and Prater, Introduction to Emergency Management, 14. 
29 Dane S. Egli, “Beyond the Storms: Strengthening Preparedness, Response, & Resilience in the 21st 
Century,” Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 2 (2013): 32–45. 
30 Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland Security?,” Homeland 
Security Affairs 4, no. 1 (2008); Menzel Baker, “Vulnerability and Resilience in Natural Disasters: A 
Marketing and Public Policy Perspective,” 114–123; B. Wayne Blanchard, “Theory, Principles and 
Fundamentals of Hazards, Disasters and U. S. Emergency Management, draft sessions 1 and 4” (online 
project course), Federal Emergency Management Agency Higher Education, 2002. 
31 Menzel Baker, “Vulnerability and Resilience in Natural Disasters: A Marketing and Public Policy 
Perspective,” 115. 
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disasters receive presidential disaster declarations.32 Therefore, the onus is on the locals 
to guide the recovery process and identify best practices, such as they can be found.  
Khan, Giurca Vasilescu, and Asmatullah explain disasters and related concepts in 
disaster management advance a theoretical approach that explains the components of the 
disaster management cycle. This cycle is characterized by interdependencies intersecting 
hazards, vulnerability, and capacity. They define a disastrous occurrence as a 
combination of hazards, vulnerabilities, and not enough capacity to reduce the risk.33 
Lindell defines disaster as “an event that produces greater losses than a community can 
handle, including casualties, property damage, and significant environmental damage.”34 
Therefore, to achieve an optimal level of resilience, communities must shift the current 
paradigm of disaster preparedness and mitigation measures “heavily tilted towards 
structural aspects and undermine non-structural elements such as the knowledge and 
capacities of local people, and the related livelihood protection issues.”35  
This approach takes the ongoing process of the disaster management cycle in the 
mitigation and preparedness phases and includes public policy and plans that breaks the 
silos approach and integrates long-term planning through vulnerability reduction (Figure 
2).  
  
                                                 
32 Lindell, Perry, and Prater, Introduction to Emergency Management, 360. 
33 Khan Himayatullah, Laura Giurca Vasilescu, and Khan Asmatullah, “Disaster Management 
Cycle—A Theoretical Approach,” Management and Marketing Journal 6, no. 1 (2008): 43–50. 
34 Lindell, Perry, and Prater, Introduction to Emergency Management, 15. 
35 Ibid., 50. 
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Figure 2.  Disaster Management Cycle 
 
Source: Khan Himayatullah, Laura Giurca Vasilescu, and Khan Asmatullah, “Disaster 
Management Cycle—A Theoretical Approach,” Management and Marketing Journal 6, 
no. 1 (2008): 49. 
These efforts work as a continuum of activities, with symbiosis between pre-
disaster activities (aimed at risk reduction) and post-disaster (aimed towards recovery). 
The combination increases the capacity of a community or individual to address most 
events through a more holistic approach, which reduces overall vulnerability and risk.36 
4. Whole Community Approach  
The whole community approach is comprised of families, businesses, non-
governmental organizations, schools and higher education, the media, and all levels of 
government (state, local, tribal, and territorial). This approach grew out of multiple 
community efforts of engagement and trying to motivate stakeholders while gaining a 
better understanding of risk and their experience with resilience following disasters. The 
Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Project Impact in 1997 took actions 
to safeguard commercial enterprises, social and familial units, and larger communities to 
mitigate the effects of natural disasters by creating public-private partnerships.  
                                                 
36 Lindell, Perry, and Prater, Introduction to Emergency Management, 46. 
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Numerous preparedness and recovery materials affirm that preparedness is a 
shared goal and by cooperating, actors in the community can keep the nation resilient.37 
Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8): National Preparedness attempts such an 
arrangement through the integration of several federal agencies, the Department of 
Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA), Small 
Business Administration (SBA), U.S. Department of Commerce/Economic Development 
Administration, etc. to work with the whole community to improve national 
preparedness. For the first time, the directive establishes a holistic approach to strengthen 
the resilience of the nation, which optimizes available resources through National 
Planning Frameworks covering the preparedness mission areas that describe how the 
whole community works together to achieve a resilient nation. The 2012 nine federal 
agency report compiled by the National Research Council report, Disaster Resilience: A 
National Imperative defined resilience as the “ability to plan for, absorb, recover from, 
and more successfully adapt to adverse impacts.”38  
The National Mitigation Framework adumbrates preparedness and harm reduction 
strategies across the entire community, and focuses on “creating a national culture shift 
that embeds risk management and mitigation in planning, decision, and development.”39 
FEMA has defined mitigation as strategies that either prevent or reduce the occurrence of 
an event and increase the community’s resilience by minimizing the adverse impact of 
disasters. Mitigation is best understood in the context of planning as an ongoing never-
ending cycle of prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery. The cycle extends from 
reducing the vulnerability of citizens and property to damage and injury, to preparing for 
                                                 
37 National Research Council, Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness and Response in the 
United States (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2001), 37; William Waugh and Kathleen. 
J. Tierney, Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government (Washington, DC: 
International City and County Management Association, 2007); Stephanie E. Chang and Adam Z. Rose, 
“Towards a Theory of Economic Recovery from Disasters,” Paper 203, Published Articles & Papers, 2012, 
http://research.create.usc.edu/published_papers/203; Committee on Increasing National Resilience to 
Hazards and Disasters; Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy (COSEPUP); Policy and 
Global Affairs (PGA); and the National Academies, Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative 
(Washington, DC: The National Academies, 2012). 
38 Ibid. 
39 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Mitigation Framework (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-25045-
9956/final_national_mitigation_framework_20130501.pdf. 
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prompt rescue efforts, to rehabilitating affected residents, businesses and damaged 
property, to assessing and planning for potential hazards and risks. However, the great 
added value of mitigation activities is that its activities are in tandem with lessons learned 
from prior incidents. 
Traditional mitigation efforts include zoning, building codes, floodplain 
acquisitions, and education about reducing loss and injury through civilian measures. 
However, in the context of this research, the writer touches upon mitigation actions that 
deal primarily with small businesses in each disaster management cycle, e.g., including 
the creation of low interest loans in the recovery phase. These loans are a component 
designed to avoid damage from future incidents to help individuals and the business 
community with long-term rebuilding or mitigation measures. While in the preparedness 
phase mitigation often comes up when “lessons learned” or “best practices” educate 
government, the business community and the public tend to focus on measures to reduce 
loss and injury. One of the ways mitigation can have long-lasting effects is to incorporate 
its efforts in the state’s comprehensive economic development plan and sustainability 
efforts to incorporate continuity planning and emergency preparedness.  
In mitigation policy guidance, the literature seems to indicate a tension between 
traditional hazard mitigation and future mitigation. Traditional hazard mitigation focuses 
on ensuring systems are able to withstand disaster forces. On the other hand, future 
mitigation programs must focus on teaching communities and institutions to reduce 
hazards since they are the central players in creating resilience. David Godschalk, in 
“Urban Hazard Mitigation: Creating Resilient Cities,” tries to understand the link 
between development, environment, and natural disaster with a global perspective that 
would enable society to become more resilient to adverse events while crafting policy 
that does not increase the risk of harm.40 Along the same lines of effort, the National 
Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) focuses on ways to restore economic viability 
and other crucial factors to small business owners. According to DHS/FEMA, the guiding 
                                                 
40 David Godschalk, “Urban Hazard Mitigation: Creating Resilient Cities,” Natural Hazards Review 4, 
no. 3 (August 2004): 136–142; U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development, Natural Disasters and 
Sustainable Development: Understanding the Links between Development, Environment and Natural 
Disasters (New York: U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development, 2002). 
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principles of this approach are including people and recording their participation in policy 
evolvement. However, crisis management literature has not addressed at length the small 
business response to disasters or considered how they respond to and recover.41 
Moreover, the creation of the Office of Resilience as part of the National Security 
Council is part of the growing “federal interest in disaster resilience as a mechanism from 
mitigating the impacts to local communities.”42 More recently the 2013 Presidential 
Policy Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience alters the resilience 
definition as “the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand 
and recover rapidly from disruptions” whether “deliberate, accidents, or naturally 
occurring threats or incidents.” As a result, the writers cite a lack of “resilience thinking, 
integrated planning, and collective action at the national, regional, state and local 
level.”43 
5. Economic Recovery and Resilience  
Economic recovery is never an easy proposition, especially for small businesses 
struck by events. Empirical studies highlight that business and micro environments are 
not destroyed by disasters and the majority of actors return to economic activity.44 
However, this research also indicates small businesses experience the greatest difficulty 
recovering from disasters. Kroll et al. identified a situational lack of resources (insurance, 
etc.) and a definitional structure that can neither afford the kind of redundancy that 
                                                 
41 Rodney C. Runyan, “Small Business in the Face of Crisis: Identifying Barriers to Recovery from a 
Natural Disaster,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 14, no. 1 (2006): 12–26. 
42 Cutter, Burton, and Emrich, “Disaster Resilience Indicators for Benchmarking Baseline 
Conditions.” 
43 Runyan, “Small Business in the Face of Crisis: Identifying Barriers to Recovery from a Natural 
Disaster,” 33. 
44 Gary R. Webb, Kathleen J. Tierney, and James M. Dahlhamer, “Business and Disasters: Empirical 
Patterns and Unanswered Questions,” Natural Hazards Review 1, no. 2 (2000): 83–90; Lam et al., 
“Business Return in New Orleans: Decision Making amid Post-Katrina Uncertainty,” PLoS ONE 4, no. 8 
(August 26, 2009): e6765, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006765. 
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mitigates a disaster’s impact nor capable of absorbing the expenses of even preparing to 
do so.45 Safety on a shoestring is somewhere between impractical and impossible.  
Moreover, an environmental component seems to be present. Damaged or blocked 
infrastructure reduces foot traffic, and reduces customers. Even businesses, which 
individually sustained minimal impact, experience difficulty recovering if the 
neighborhood around them is significantly damaged.46 Nevertheless, a silver lining is that 
the business continuity industry is rapidly growing fulfilling a niche in services not 
previously available or government centric. 
Paton and Johnson define disaster resilience “as the ability of a community to 
withstand a severe shock” and then, return “to a new normal based on lessons learned and 
improvements made that make a community less vulnerable and more adaptable.”47 Tim 
Beatley expands on the concept and argues that resilience includes “the ability to adapt to 
changing conditions” while building organizational capacity to create cooperative 
institutions capable of supporting disaster response and recovery.48  
Conversely, Patricia Longstaff49 moves beyond the definitional debate of 
resilience and advances not only a definition, she also recommends a structural 
framework to address the growing need of the homeland security and disaster 
management fields to build resilient communities. The contribution moves beyond 
                                                 
45 Cynthia A. Kroll et al., Economic Impacts of the Loma Prieta Earthquake: A Focus on Small 
Businesses (Working Paper 91–187) (Berkeley, CA: U.C. Transportation Center and the Center for Real 
Estate and Urban Economics, University of California at Berkeley, 1991); Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer, 
“Business and Disasters: Empirical Patterns and Unanswered Questions,” 83–90; Gary R. Webb, Kathleen 
J. Tierney, and James M. Dahlhamer, “Predicting Long-Term Business Recovery from Disasters: A 
Comparison of the Loma Prieta Earthquake and Hurricane Andrew,” Environmental Hazards no. 4 (2002): 
45–58; Stephanie E. Chang, “Disasters and Transport Systems: Loss, Recovery, and Competition at the 
Port of Kobe after the 1995 Earthquake,” Journal of Transport Geography 8, no. 1 (2000): 53–65. 
46 Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer, “Business and Disasters: Empirical Patterns and Unanswered 
Questions,” 83-90; Chang, “Disasters and Transport Systems: Loss, Recovery, and Competition at the Port 
of Kobe after the 1995 Earthquake,” 53-65. 
47 Douglas Paton and David Johnston, Disaster Resilience: An Integrated Approach (Springfield IL: 
CC Thomas, 2006). 
48 Timothy Beatley, Planning for Coastal Resilience: Best Practices for Calamitous Times 
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 2006). 
49 Patricia H. Longstaff, “Building Resilient Communities: A Preliminary Framework for 
Assessment,” Homeland Security Affairs 6, issue 3 (September 2010). 
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government rhetoric and academic debates and provides a policy tool, based on Nobel 
Laureate Elinor Ostrom’s framework to “identify the elements (and the relationships 
among these elements)...to consider for analysis...organize diagnostic and prescriptive 
inquiry...[and] provide the most general set of variables that should be used to analyze all 
types of settings relevant for the framework.”50 Longstaff’s work examines five 
community subsystems, which she labels “ecological, economic, physical infrastructure, 
civil society, and governance” for a more concrete analysis adaptable to community 
circumstances. Similarly, Cutter discusses similar elements as one strives to create a 
baseline resilience indicator for communities in five areas (social, economic, institutional, 
infrastructure, and community capital).51 Community circumstances can be worked. 
However, both findings are not extensive enough and further research is necessary. 
The DHS/FEMA working definition of “preparedness” describes “a continuous 
cycle of planning, organizing, training, equipping, exercising, evaluating, and taking 
corrective action in an effort to ensure effective coordination during incident response.”52  
The practical aspects of preparedness are delineated in the national preparedness 
system. The system’s goals are effective prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery 
in the event of disasters. However, prevailing notions of preparedness focus on the public 
sector, without addressing small businesses.  
Wilson et al. focus on the preparatory and restorative functions of disaster 
management. Among their findings are the apparent collective social difficulties 
assessing risk that come with natural disasters.53 Numerous cognitive distortions produce 
errors, e.g., people tend to equate occurrence with frequency; if a flood took place once, 
their perception of the likelihood of more flooding diminishes. Also, psychological 
                                                 
50 Ostrom, Elinor, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2005), 28. 
51 Cutter, Burton, and Emrich, “Disaster Resilience Indicators for Benchmarking Baseline 
Conditions.” 
52 Homeland Security, “Plan and Prepare for Disasters,” Official website of the Department of 
Homeland Security, accessed February 22, 2014, https://www.dhs.gov/topic/plan-and-prepare-disasters. 
53 Sean Wilson et al., “The Lack of Disaster Preparedness by the Public and it’s Affect on 
Communities,” The Internet Journal of Rescue and Disaster Medicine 7, no. 2 (2007), http://ispub.com/ 
IJRDM/7/2/11721. 
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experiments revealed that people may be willing to accept possible damage from a 
catastrophic event and yet unwilling to absorb, a priori, the certain costs of insurance 
payments.  
Wilson et al. use the $9.1 billion handed by FEMA and the SBA in a 16-year 
period to argue that these government bailouts create a disincentive for non-governmental 
(or non-federal) efforts at reducing risk prior to disaster. This argument relies on 
characterizing post-disaster relief efforts undertaken by government as “insurance.” 
Similarly, Menzel Baker (while examining paradoxes that constraint resilience) makes 
the argument that “if individuals, communities or institutions do not carry the full burden 
of their consequences of lack of self-sufficiency, they may become less resilient.”54 She 
uses the example of two homeowners losing their homes. One used mitigation 
(insurance) while the government steps in for the other and rebuilds the home. Thus, the 
homeowner who carries insurance no longer feels an incentive to do so. This posture is 
highly problematic, as it raises the question of the “moral hazard” inversion of FEMA 
and SBA programs awarding risk-takers, and punishing risk averters, as the programs 
socialize repair and restoration of costs.55  
Nevertheless, recovery research from the American Planning Association suggest 
that most states are requiring the inclusion of natural hazards as part of their 
comprehensive plans and those plans encourage disaster loss reduction. For instance, per 
capita flood losses were found in one study to be lower for the states with the 
requirement. However, it is important to note the policy shift enabled by the Disaster 
Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA 2000) amending the Stafford Act to require state 
mitigation plans and providing financial incentives to local jurisdictions that adopt local 
hazard mitigation plans.56 
                                                 
54 Menzel Baker, “Vulnerability and Resilience in Natural Disasters: A Marketing and Public Policy 
Perspective,” 114–123. 
55 Wilson et al., “The Lack of Disaster Preparedness by the Public and it’s Affect on Communities.” 
56 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000,” Department of 
Homeland Security, accessed February 15, 2014, http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/ 
4596. 
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Similarly, “Response and Recovery after the Joplin Tornado,” by Smith and 
Sutter juxtaposes the Joplin Tornado public safety response and Hurricane Katrina to 
offer a case study of the recovery efforts of both incidents. This research documents how 
incentives by Joplin’s private sector sped up the recovery process. Local state 
government relaxed regulations, waived procurement processes and bidding procedures, 
and hired extra building inspectors. During Hurricane Katrina, institutional factors were 
detrimental to the efforts.57  
Also, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. 
Senate “Disaster Recovery: Past Experience of America’s Small Business in Rebuilding 
Their Communities,” applies lessons learned from Hurricane Ike and Gustav and the 
2008 Midwest floods. A section of the report looks at enhancing the procurement process 
to provide loans, technical assistance, and support in navigating federal bureaucracy. 
Childs also makes further suggestions for disaster recovery plans.58 In spite of the 
popularity of the book, the challenge for federal, state, and private stakeholders has been 
the engagement of small businesses, and individual citizens to ensure the resiliency of 
their organizations, and thus, the nation. 
6. Entrepreneurship—The Link  
 Small business entrepreneurs could adapt several features from the entrepreneur 
community to aggregate/develop the necessary skills and knowledge to withstand a 
business interruption. The main goal is the actors’ collaboration on projects, and 
development of some capacity to access networks to provide input/assistance. If it is 
possible to build resilience within the system, the entrepreneur may be the best professor.  
In fact, an article on the meaning of social entrepreneurship lays out a succinct 
development of the word entrepreneur. The word is French in origin and describes 
someone who acts on plans. The concept gained acceptance as identifying the daring 
                                                 
57 Daniel J. Smith and Daniel Sutter, “Response and Recovery after the Joplin Tornado: Lessons 
Applied and Lessons Learned,” Social Science Research Network, 2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2261353. 
58 Donna R. Childs, Prepare for the Worst, Plan for the Best: Disaster Preparedness and Recovery for 
Small Businesses (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008). 
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economic actor who would find new ways of conducting business to stimulate the 
economy. Jean Baptiste Say has been credited with expanding the term around the 19th 
century by stating, “The entrepreneur shifts economic resources out of an area of lower 
and into an area of higher productivity and greater yield.”59 In the 20th century, Joseph 
Schumpeter described entrepreneurship as, “the function of entrepreneurs is to reform or 
revolutionize the pattern of production, by exploring an invention or, more generally, an 
untried technological possibility for producing a new commodity or producing an old one 
in a new way, or by reorganizing the industry.”60 Both definitions identify a common 
core as individuals who bring innovation, and thus, value added by “breaking the mold,” 
i.e., disrupting existing practices and orthodoxies.  
More contemporary writers, such as Peter Drucker, considered the founder of 
modern management, added that entrepreneurs create value by seeking opportunities. He 
states, “the entrepreneur searches for change, responds to it, and exploits it as an 
opportunity.” Similarly, Howard Stevenson61 sees entrepreneurship as “the pursuit of 
opportunity beyond the resources you currently control.”62 Anthony Tjan, in 
“Vulnerability: The Defining Trait of Great Entrepreneurs,” explores the balancing act 
between taking a calculated risk and the vulnerability of pivoting to take on new 
challenges until finding that defining invention. He cites James Dyson who made over 
5,100 prototypes and, on his 5,126th variation, developed the “right” vacuum cleaner. He 
states, “The great test of a great entrepreneur is one who can continue in the face of 
failure and does not fall prey to passive vulnerability.”63 This defining characteristic 
makes the entrepreneurial spirit such a formidable group to explore.  
                                                 
59 Dees J. Gregory, “The Meaning of Social Entrepreneurship,” The Kauffman Center for 
Entrepreneurial Leadership, accessed November 16, 2014, http://www.partnerships.org.au/Library/the_ 
meaning_of_social_entrepreneurship.htm. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Former Business Administration faculty at Harvard Business School, who ignited the startup 
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for authoring over 100 cases and increasing faculty capacity from a diminutive five to 35 as of 2014. 
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63 Anthony Tjan, “Vulnerability: The Defining Trait of Great Entrepreneurs,” Harvard Business 
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Besides these writers, networks exist that focus on fostering the entrepreneurial 
spirit in the United States, such as the Kauffman Foundation, which reports assets of 
approximately two billion dollars and revolves most of their activities around education 
and entrepreneurship. In 2011, it partnered with Startup Weekend to build the capacity of 
entrepreneurs and have developing concepts created in 54 hours. This collaboration has 
been successful and has spread to more than 175 cities in 100 countries, and has created 
an alumni base of more than 45,000 and growing.  
Similarly, the Y Combinator contains defining features to emulate resources, such 
as monetary and in-kind, and a prominent expanded network. The Combinator spends a 
lot of time teaching, and helping to navigate paperwork, and to guide by affiliation. It is 
similar to having a prominent member of the community in a leadership position, such as 
a board member and/or president, and its viability by association. The messaging on their 
website states, “The kind of advice we give literally can’t be bought, because anyone 
qualified to give it is already rich. You can only get it from investors.”64  
Eric Ries wrote the The Lean Startup that showcases pioneering strategies for 
startup companies to go from concept to implementation. One of his mantras is, “Startup 
success is not a consequence of good genes or being in the right place at the right time. 
Startup success can be engineered by following the right process, which means it can be 
learned, which means it can be taught.”65 This entrepreneurial insight leaves a question 
as to whether small business entrepreneurs can connect to the right network and use 
existing structures to augment their strengths and minimize their weaknesses. One of the 
networks closely examined is the resource partners from the SBA. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study examines preparation decisions by small business 
owners/entrepreneurs, which is the theoretical population of interest. The proposed 
                                                 
64 Eric Ries, “Welcome to the Success Factory,” Management Today. April 1, 2012, http://www. 
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65 Eric Ries, “Introduction,” in The Lean Startup: How Today's Entrepreneurs Use Continuous 
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research uses the definition used by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to qualify for a 
tax credit under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The IRS specifies a 
“small business” employs no more than twenty-five employees who earn below $50,000 
in average annual wages.  
The plan is to create a prototype similar to a business incubator, designed to 
decrease the failure rate pre- and post-disaster through education and wrap-around 
services. The business incubator concept has been advanced in the tech world and has 
accelerated growth in the past decade. Startupers and/or techies are not afraid to fail, 
testing methodologies along the way, learning from mistakes, and building on those 
experiences. These failures in the business world are called “pivots,” as they allow 
someone to pivot the original idea. Entrepreneurs will have failures along with successes; 
to borrow a popular metaphor, it is the nature of the beast. However, the theoretical 
population of interest would benefit greatly from this prospective modeling, as it might 
prove to be the difference between building capacity and resilience or imminent failure 
with its concomitant damages. 
A cross-section design is used for this research. The structure of a cross-sectional, 
as opposed to longitudinal research, examines subjects so that their differences are 
minimized, except for the characteristics of the study. 
The advantage of a cross-sectional design is that it has no time dimension or 
interventions so that two populations will be compared in terms of differences of the 
outcome variable. In this instance, the outcome variable is disaster preparation. Time 
constraints have led to several limitations that include small businesses comprised of a 
kaleidoscope of entrepreneurs over 50, minority, rural/urban, veterans, guards, reservists, 
women, and youth. These variations may have an effect on outcomes, although it is also 
beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, the research looks at small business as a whole 
community without delving deeper into other factors.  
It is beyond the scope of this research to determine the reasons for small business 
failure (not attributed to a disaster). Some of the reasons cited by the SBA include “lack 
of experience, insufficient capital or vulnerability to cash flow, poor location, poor 
inventory management, over-investment in fixed assets, poor credit arrangement 
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management, personal use of business funds, unexpected growth, competition and low 
sales.”66 Although, the information is related, it is not central to this inquiry, and thus, 
not inside the boundaries. 
Lastly, trying to address the perspective of the 50 states and/or the more than 
80,000 municipalities is beyond the scope of this research. This thesis rests on data 
acquired from a comprehensive analysis of academic literature based on case studies. 
Published surveys and interviews gathered from secondary data sources expands the 
scope to a three-prong approach, which broadens the analysis and allows this researcher 
to draw better conclusions from the combination of the different perspectives.  
This research will contribute to the national discussion by focusing on an 
emerging trend; that is, the need to enhance resilience through business preparedness. 
Building resilience involves reviewing past responses, and those efforts form a national 
model for implementation. Some of the federal agencies that would benefit from this 
model include the FEMA/DHS, the SBA, the Economic Development 
Administration/Department of Commerce, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National 
Federation of Independent Business, and the insurance industry among others. 
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter I contains the problem statement and the literature review that explores 
risk and vulnerability, the whole community approach, economic development and 
resilience, and entrepreneurial principles and practices. Chapter II provides a deep 
background on the complexity and challenges facing small business owners including 
federal evolution, and some of the psychological and social barriers that might be at play. 
Chapter III explores partnerships and perspectives that continue to change the landscape 
promoting best practices. This chapter is divided into two sections (best practices and 
perspectives) that highlight continuity planning, models used overseas, as well as home 
and business alliances shaping policy towards more inclusiveness of the business sector. 
Chapter IV introduces the proposed model of a wrap-around services business incubator 
                                                 
66 Michael Ames, “Small Business Management,” VETBIZ Resource Center, accessed March 2013, 
http://www.vetbizresourcecenter.com/transition/Why_Small_Businesses_Fail.html. 
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and explores the possibility to promote resilience through a “hat trick approach,”67 
leveraging social network analysis, community asset mapping, and scenario planning. 
Chapter V provides the conclusions and further reflections, based on this research. 
                                                 
67 According to the Merriam Webster Dictionary a “hat trick” is a series of three victories and it is also 
used in sports including soccer, hockey and cricket.  
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II. COMPLEXITY AND CHALLENGES 
Federal guidance has evolved to account for deficiencies and for greater 
integration of public-private partnerships, which reflects the current operating 
environment and fiscal restraints. This chapter sets the stage for a deep background on 
some of the underlying reasons for small business failures and further explores how the 
lack of planning, accountability, cultural disconnect, and bureaucratic hurdles are 
detrimental in the overall economic development of small business owners.  
For a community to be truly resilient, it must enhance its capacity for disaster 
preparedness and recovery through a support structure that leverages resources and 
capacity to increase planning efforts and a generally active engagement with anticipation. 
For small business entrepreneurs, their operating environment must address the “what if” 
question and it constantly shifts by preparing for the worst possible outcome. Resilience 
requires maintaining and augmenting the knowledge base via training and education, and 
facilitating small business’ access to the tools and equipment necessary to address those 
contingencies. 
A. LACK OF PLANNING  
A number of key considerations need to be addressed to move small businesses 
toward deeper engagement and a commitment to continuity planning. Although systems 
within the government already exist to support the challenges of business disruption, they 
have not been geared towards enhancing small business capacity. When considering the 
challenges of the 21st century, it is important to remember the popular chiasmus;68 by 
failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail.  
Small business entrepreneurs neglect to build preparedness and bridge gaps to 
achieve resilience for many reasons. Less access to insurance, and other financial 
means/resources, combined with isolated facilities and day-to-day business realities, 
                                                 
68 Although it has been attributed to Benjamin Franklin, its source remains unknown. 
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create limited opportunities for pre-disaster mitigation and preparedness.69 However, they 
need to focus on two main goals, embracing preparedness because their financial success 
depends on the ability to recover faster than the competition, and developing the 
resilience necessary to endure the next event by building capacity.  
Research on small businesses post-disaster recovery in the 1990s focused on 
different types of disasters, while in the 2000s, research has been based on business 
factors including size, geographic location, and the industrial sector.70 Empirical studies 
and literature would suggest, “businesses and local economies are generally resilient to 
disasters, and most businesses do recover.”71 Nevertheless, it has been discovered that 
some sectors and local economies are more prone to difficulty in recovering from 
disasters than others, especially small businesses.  
The vulnerability is a consequence of small profit margins, insufficient flexible 
business management models, or lack of redundancy in facility location.72 For example, 
Gastkill, Van Auken, and Manning examined 245 clothing storeowners whose small 
businesses failed from 1988 to 1991. This work combined the operational aspects of 
small business failures and the interrelated nature of the business environment to confirm 
                                                 
69 Kroll et al., Economic Impacts of the Loma Prieta Earthquake: A Focus on Small Businesses, 91–
187; Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer, “Business and Disasters: Empirical Patterns and Unanswered 
Questions,” 83–90; Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer, “Predicting Long-Term Business Recovery from 
Disasters: A Comparison of the Loma Prieta Earthquake and Hurricane Andrew,” 45–58; Chang, “Disasters 
and Transport Systems: Loss, Recovery, and Competition at the Port of Kobe after the 1995 Earthquake,” 
53–65. 
70 Schrank et al., “Small-Business Demise and Recovery after Katrina: Rate of Survival and Demise,” 
Natural Hazards 65, no. 3 (February 2013): 2357. 
71 Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer, “Business and Disasters: Empirical Patterns and Unanswered 
Questions,” 83–90; Lam et al., “Business Return in New Orleans: Decision Making Amid Post-Katrina 
Uncertainty,” e6765. 71/journal.pone.0006765. 
72 Kroll et al., Economic Impacts of the Loma Prieta Earthquake: A Focus on Small Businesses, 91–
187; Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer, “Business and Disasters: Empirical Patterns and Unanswered 
Questions,” 83-90; Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer, “Predicting Long-Term Business Recovery from 
Disasters: A Comparison of the Loma Prieta Earthquake and Hurricane Andrew,” 45–58; Chang, “Disasters 
and Transport Systems: Loss, Recovery, and Competition at the Port of Kobe after the 1995 Earthquake,” 
53–65.  
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research pointing to managerial and planning functions as a controlling factor in business 
failure.73  
Previous research conducted by Keats and Bracker had found that “the neophyte 
entrepreneur at a very early stage of cognitive strategic sophistication would not be 
prepared to comprehend and employ sophisticated management concepts and 
techniques.”74 Hence, findings suggest that small business owners sometimes make 
ineffective decisions as a result of inadequate decision-making skills. This lack of 
planning permeates most aspects of success, including competitiveness, growth, and 
expansion, which illustrates the interdependencies leading small business entrepreneurs 
to financial distress and failure.  
However, a study conducted by Schrank et al. published in late 2012 takes a 
different approach and examines the rate of survival and demise of small businesses. The 
study provides a more comprehensive picture of the recovery cycle. Research literature 
has lacked interviews with owners of non-surviving businesses that has left “a gaping 
hole in our knowledge about disaster impacts on small businesses.”75 The gap is part of a 
lack of context as to how the owners of the failed businesses prepared for disasters, how 
their business was impacted by the event, and what happened afterwards. Context 
provides a more comprehensive picture and makes it possible to grasp possible patterns 
to avoid. For instance, a slowdown in the small business sector of a disaster zone has a 
larger effect because 52 percent of businesses are operated from the owner’s home or 
property. As a result, the damage has an impact at both the micro level (family and the 
small business) and at the macro level (the supply chain management), which 
consequently impedes the chances of both the business and the family to recover.76 
                                                 
73 LuAnn Ricketts Gaskill, Howard E. Van Auken, and Ronald A. Manning, “A Factor Analytic Study 
of the Perceived Causes of Small Business Failure,” Journal of Small Business Management 31, no. 4 
(October 1993): 18–31. 
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Similarly, research conducted by Pan explores the dispersal of estimated adverse 
consequences in a major metropolitan area further. Pan’s work used a hurricane-based 
scenario and tools advanced by FEMA’s Hazus software. The Hazus loss and risk 
software can be used in all phases of emergency management, envisioning four types of 
disasters: hurricanes, earthquakes, coastal surge, and flooding. It utilizes geographic 
information to calculate the exposure of an area, the level of intensity, and the potential 
economic losses, damage to infrastructure, and even the social impacts of disasters on the 
entire community. The model predicted more than $30.3 billion from property damage 
and income-related business interruptions for an eight-county metro region within the 
Houston-Galveston area.77 Both approaches provide a more detailed understanding of 
how small business entrepreneurs anticipate, make preparations, sometimes fail, make 
subsequent adjustments, and either recover or become extinct. Small business 
entrepreneurs suffer greater economic losses and business disruptions than their corporate 
counterparts, which highlights that effective strategies can reduce a small business’ 
vulnerabilities.  
These findings are congruent with Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.78 The 
psychological motivation for safety and security is second only to the motivation for food 
and water, and thus, the small business entrepreneur will concentrate in satisfying those 
needs for at least the first six months. Although Maslow crafted this theory with 
individuals in mind, small businesses are a group of individuals, and as such it can be 
theorized that small businesses have similar motivations, such as safety, esteem, and 
growth that need to be understood and nurtured. The challenge for policymakers and 
practitioners becomes how to tap into this psychological hierarchy by addressing the way 
small business entrepreneurs undermine their success and livelihood by failing to prepare. 
Reframed as resilience, a proactive form of insurance, or community responsibility, 
implementing preparation and mitigation becomes a form of a status-seeking event that 
can accrue considerable social and financial benefits. 
                                                 
77 Qisheng Pan, “Economic Losses from a Hypothetical Hurricane Event in the Houston-Galveston 
Area,” Natural Hazards Review 12, no. 3 (2010): 146–155. 
78 Saul McLeod, “Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs,” Simply Psychology, 2007, http://www.simply 
psychology.org/maslow.html. 
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Corey and Deitch conducted research on the factors contributing to business 
recovery six to eight months immediately following Hurricane Katrina. This research is 
significant because it looks at the organization level including disaster preparation and 
business recovery. Approximately 183 surviving organizations were interviewed in the 
Greater New Orleans area. Operating under the hypothesis that organizations with an 
emergency response plan would have better resources to prepare, the authors looked for 
multiple levels of redundancy that could protect against predictable problems in 
communication, which would yield a better organizational performance. At the 
conclusion of their work, they were able to confirm that organizations with an emergency 
plan in place were able to “protect their businesses and maximize their ability to continue 
to do business than did those without a plan.”79 Those findings are similar to research by 
Perry, which suggests that despite small businesses conducting little planning in general, 
“firms that failed had engaged in less planning than other firms.”80 Despite this 
conclusion being seemingly obvious and dictated by common sense, it is backed by 
empirical data and it furthers the body of knowledge and literature for practitioners. 
Moreover, businesses plan adoption rate statistics dating back to 1997 showed that 
disaster preparedness had increased. For example, in Grand Forks, North Dakota, a flood-
prone area, the percentage was close to 12 percent, and in Des Moines, Iowa, it was 29 
percent; while Memphis, a city vulnerable to earthquakes, was at 22 percent.  
Research conducted by Zolin suggests a “business continuity plan” that includes 
the protection of a small business’ data.81 In New Orleans, where businesses closed for 
nearly a month post-Katrina, the businesses that had data stored remotely fared better. 
However, this contingency was not available to small business entrepreneurs or was 
prohibitively expensive. Although, with the advancement of technology, backing 
information to “the cloud” makes it easier to avoid the chaotic obstacles to 
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communication and resource management that businesses experienced because of 
Hurricane Katrina.  
Other factors that attributed to the failure of small business entrepreneurs include 
limited capacity for pre-disaster mitigation and preparedness, lack of insurance or being 
underinsured, a dependence on generating revenue from customers who are also impacted 
by the disaster.82 In fact, research examined the percentage of small business 
entrepreneurs who carried insurance and found that in Des Moines during the 1993 
floods, only 8 percent of businesses carried insurance, while in Los Angeles during the 
1994 Northridge earthquake, only 20 percent of businesses carried earthquake insurance. 
However, the numbers sampled from 183 businesses in the Greater New Orleans Region 
were much higher, with 38 percent possessing business recovery insurance, 64 percent 
flood insurance, and 68 percent business interruption insurance.83  
The operating environment involved with the restoration of lifeline infrastructure 
plays an important role in business recovery and infrastructure concerns, especially 
relating to businesses in highly damaged or particularly challenging recovery areas, and 
for highly vulnerable retail businesses because of a reliance on foot traffic.84  
A recent symposium highlighted the need for further research and stated 
“Achieving resilience in a cost effective manner requires better understanding of the 
elements of resilience and the development of appropriate metrics suitable for evaluation, 
benefit-cost and tradeoff analyses for facilities, networks and communities based on 
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systems thinking with interdependence, uncertainty and complexity considerations.”85 
Although neither emergency managers nor business continuity managers can predict with 
precision a disaster, they can mitigate its impact, and prepare and adjust for its 
consequences through the unification of emergency management as it refers to public 
sector activity (e.g., municipalities, communities) managing consequences, and business 
continuity management (BCM) as a private sector activity (e.g., companies, small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs)) managing business impact.86  
B. FEDERAL GUIDANCE EVOLUTION  
Planning is not simply relevant to small business entrepreneurs and their 
operating environment; it involves the support structures within the federal government 
for a community approach. Guidance released in the 2014 Second Quadrennial Homeland 
Security Review reflects changes in the strategic operational environment to account for 
more costly natural hazard responses and the interdependencies of factors including aging 
baby boomers, aging infrastructure, and climate change.  
Emergency response during the 1990s, whether ongoing efforts in the Los 
Angeles earthquake of 1994, the North Dakota Floods in 1997 or the heat waves of 1999, 
highlighted deficiencies and raised awareness that states were not fully prepared to 
respond to natural disasters. 
In the aftermath of 9/11, and through the creation of the DHS, specific policy 
guidance documents have been intertwining preparedness to enhance the nation, 
including the National Response Plan, the National Incident Management System, and 
the National Preparedness Goal. Local programs benefited through the incorporation of 
the DMA 2000 that made changes to allow for additional funds for hazard mitigation 
planning including the prioritization of risk assessments and mitigation strategies. 
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In 2003, the Homeland Security Policy Directive 8 stated, “the national 
preparedness goal will establish measurable readiness priorities and targets … [and] will 
also include readiness metrics and elements that support the national preparedness 
goal.”87  
The 2004 National Response Plan created a framework to respond to natural 
disasters or terrorist attacks based in the emergency management maxim that all disasters 
are local, which places the responsibility for natural disaster planning and response at the 
local level. Once a local government has taxed its resources, the process proceeds to the 
state, and then to the federal government.  
Hurricane Katrina was a dramatic and painful moment for the nation. New 
Orleans had always been one of America’s “party” towns. The celebration of Mardi Gras 
has become a legend. Yet, all social stability broke down. Emergency personnel were 
overwhelmed. The civilian population was not only “on its own,” but at times, the public 
safety department was a danger to its civilians.88 The confusion and suffering 
demonstrated that the lack of central authority can have devastating effects on disaster 
response and addressing public safety needs. In fact, scholars who have examined the 
Katrina response posit that although response relies on various coordinated actions by 
government entities, in Katrina, it failed because it was not a system.89  
However, “takeaways” from Hurricane Katrina and the enactment by Congress of 
the legislation,90 established responsive hierarchies. It also enabled FEMA to control 
grants for state and municipalities to improve capabilities and leverage the entire system 
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towards preparedness, response, and recovery efforts, and helped to solidify the private 
sector including a private sector division.91 
The private sector division has been key in building coalitions with businesses 
and non-governmental agencies to develop a more comprehensive approach in facilitating 
innovation and collaboration. Similarly, the Bush administration examined lessons 
learned outlining 17 specific lessons and 125 recommendations for corrective action, 
including the synchronization of policies, strategies, and plans into a unified system, and 
adopted a culture of preparedness.92  
One administrator, a Colonel Booth, stated that in emergency management, a 
cliché state all disasters are local; in other words, the local authorities will respond to the 
incident based on their expertise and knowledge of the area, and the state and federal 
partners will provide support. However, Col. Booth seems to suggest that after Katrina, it 
is no longer the case, stating, “Sometimes I think it changed the world and sometimes I 
wonder if anybody was paying attention.”93 These comments reflect the reality that under 
those dire circumstances, no authority or place was possible to govern from since the 
floods had destroyed so much.  
Yet, as past experience indicates, humans adapt to the threat landscape via lessons 
learned and adjusting guidance, with an eye to enduring the next event. For instance, in 
2008, the 2004 National Response Plan was replaced by the National Response 
Framework because of the realization that after catastrophic events, government 
resources alone cannot meet the requirements of those affected.  
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In 2011, PPD-8 codified the inclusion of the whole community approach. More 
recently, in 2013, the second edition of the Framework was released, providing further 
guidance based on themes that emerged from several events, including the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill. Also, lessons from 2012, specifically concerning Hurricane Sandy, 
were included.  
All these policy frameworks share a more holistic response to past experiences 
that confirmed that, initially at least, local responders would be on their own while state 
and federal resources are marshaled. The community will need to cooperate to encompass 
national preparedness. This gradual shift has been the catalyst for federal guidance to 
integrate mitigation and preparedness efforts by placing the onus back on individuals and 
communities for their well-being for at least 72 hours. Moreover, a key distinction of the 
capabilities to achieve the National Preparedness Goal is that public-private partnerships 
are finally established as a prominent feature. This integration further facilitates the 
entrance of small business entrepreneurs as a subset and demonstrates the need for 
disaster planning as part of good business practice.  
C. RESPONSIBILITY  
Small business owners are intrinsically risk-takers, since it is a given that the 
likelihood of going bankrupt is about half within the first year, and they are lucky if a 
business is profitable after two years. The risk proposition in its bare form breaks down to 
three choices: assume the risk, mitigate the risk, or transfer the risk through insurance. 
However, despite these realities, optimism and an interrelated psychological component 
can cause a person to believe that the problem is external, rather than taking 
responsibility. In Thinking in Systems, Donella Meadows makes this argument when she 
states, “It’s almost irresistible to blame something or someone else, to shift responsibility 
away from ourselves, and to look for the control knob, the product, the pill, the technical 
fix that will make a problem go away.”94 Furthermore, a symbiotic relationship exists 
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between government and small businesses, and despite the tension of having different 
interests and goals, they both benefit from one another.  
Similarly, Meadows suggests that the solution only becomes apparent when the 
structure is perceived “as the source of its own problems, and find the courage and 
wisdom to restructure it.”95 Van der Heijden discusses how, in a competitive world, an 
organization does not need to be perfect, but if the business is able to “react a little faster 
than its competitors to environmental impulses, seeing dangers and opportunities a little 
earlier, then it has a preferential position in the battle for survival.”96 Both Meadows and 
van der Heijden reflect the need to take ownership and use the necessary tools within the 
system to effect change. That change might stem from learning to navigate governmental 
processes, understanding the dynamics of entrepreneurship from idea to implementation, 
or increasing preparedness.  
In the context of addressing problems, in the Logic of Failure, Dorner explains 
that psychologically, people “neglect them because we don’t have those problems at the 
moment and therefore are not suffering from their ill effects. In short, we are captives of 
the moment.”97 However, being captives of the moment undercuts all the work that a 
small business owner does every day to thrive. For instance, during Hurricane Sandy, 
many businesses downplayed the risk because they had never experienced a storm of that 
magnitude. This sort of blunder has been described in the field of psychology as 
cognitive bias, which is an error in the way the brain processes information, or perception 
versus the facts behind it.  
A recent article by Regina Phelps refers to cognitive bias or “faulty thinking.” Her 
article shows how small business entrepreneurs become victims of cognitive bias through 
overweighting an individual’s experience, overconfidence, and failure to believe 
disconfirming evidence.98 For example, she shares that businesses with continuity plans 
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in place during Hurricane Sandy truly believed that they would be just fine; yet found 
themselves playing catch-up. However, it is noteworthy that the possibility of a direct hit 
from Hurricane Sandy was downplayed because “a storm of this size had never happened 
before.”99 Similarly, Mark Lupo of the Georgia Small Business Development Center 
challenges the current messaging techniques appealing to fear. He states, “the 
predominant message within the preparedness effort seems to be, either develop a 
preparedness plan or your business will probably not survive the next disaster.”  
However, as already alluded to, the message is not resonating. Lupo builds his 
argument on Malcolm Gladwell’s bestseller the Tipping Point to describe the lack of the 
“stickiness factor,” or how memorable a message is. He sees a much-needed shift in 
paradigm to the value proposition by focusing on the why. Lupo posits that businesses 
with a business continuity plan can “potentially re-open for business more quickly than 
those that do not and can increase their market share by doing business with those 
needing their product/service before others can re-open.”100 Recent surveys show that 
“forty-one percent of small business employees have never participated in safety drills, 
and thirty-eight percent have never participated in safety training.”101 In 2010, one source 
pointed out that within two years after losing their data; only 6 percent of businesses 
survive.102 
D. CULTURE  
You were mentioning that 40 percent of small businesses fail after a 
disaster. That is a high figure, almost staggering. Now, what can we do 
differently to avert that? Is there anything that we can do to mitigate that? 
~ Sen. Landrieu, U.S. Senate Hearing,  
Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, September 15, 2011 
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Since most small business owners have many priorities competing for their 
limited resources, they are unlikely to put time and effort into preparedness, unless the 
reasoning of preparedness, the value proposition, and the return on investment at the 
individual level becomes more tangible. Despite many theories presented of why 
businesses succeed or fail, no agreed upon definition exists besides general growth, 
profitability, and long-term sustainability. Success remains quite subjective. However, 
because of subjectivity, examining some of the related social-cognitive theories including 
attribution theory and self-efficacy that contribute to small businesses success or failure 
will be useful to practitioners. Some research suggests that attribution theory accounts for 
psychological factors and has been linked to small business failures. “Attribution theory” 
attempts to explain the human behavior of explanation.103  
A study of entrepreneurs found them inclined towards self-serving narratives 
concerning outcomes.104 Attribution theory looked at three common errors or biases 
including blame the victim (people are blamed for their condition, rather than looking at 
elements); the actor-observer effect (tendency to see an individual’s own behavior as 
caused by situational factors); and self-serving attribution bias (taking credit for success 
while omitting responsibility for failure). They sampled three different groups: a specific 
sample of 189 pharmacy owners, 231 broad examples, and a third group comprised of 16 
experts in entrepreneurship, graduates of an master’s in a business administration 
program, business counselors in a college-based entrepreneurship centers, and professors 
of entrepreneurship.  
Findings confirmed that the broad group of business owners attributed external 
factors at a rate of 84 percent, while the pharmacist sample attributed a much higher 
number of 95 percent, compared with the expert panel at 72 percent.  
The significance of the attribution theory when applied to the field of 
entrepreneurship is that the tendency to blame others or events “may arise from a desire 
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to be held harmless for poor management decisions.”105 In other words, a small business 
entrepreneur is overdetermined to exhibit this self-serving bias to explain an absence of a 
business plan or business continuity planning. Rogoff’s research expands 
entrepreneurship education. It might be valuable to “alert entrepreneurs and aspiring 
peers to a possible bias that blames external factors for failure.”  
Self-awareness is quite empowering and could be leveraged in the creation of 
educational materials. Rogoff’s conclusions confirm to entrepreneurs that success and 
failure depends “equally on her or his actions and may take greater personal 
responsibility in determining the business outcome.”106 
A second cognition theory influencing personal intervention that relates to small 
business entrepreneurs is self-efficacy. Self-efficacy is defined as “an individual’s beliefs 
about their capabilities to perform, and in turn, affect how people feel, think, motivate 
themselves and behave.”107 Under this approach, people will make choices and 
determine how much time and effort will be spent persevering in the face of difficulties, 
based on their belief in the ability to perform that activity.  
However, those who underestimate their capacity are easily discouraged by 
setbacks, while those who believe in their capacity will persevere until successful. 
Hurricane Katrina has prompted great insight in terms of both federal guidance and as a 
laboratory with very practical applications on disaster recovery for practitioners. For 
instance, a dissertation by Blake Escudier took a comprehensive look at different 
problems faced by small business entrepreneurs during Hurricane Katrina. Specifically, 
Escudier focused on the involvement of the Small Business Development Center as a 
key-supporting framework able to help mitigate further problems. The study used three 
variables, including the type of business (retail vs. trade), the time elapsed between the 
disaster, and the request for assistance during a two-year recovery period to provide 
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“evidence of affect on the ability of a business owner to recover from problems during a 
dynamic environment.”108  
The study underscores the relationship between the environment and the business 
owner’s self-efficacy, as it assumes that once small business entrepreneurs believe they 
are no longer capable of making a business decision, they will turn to outside 
assistance.109 This information is relevant because it provides valuable clues as to how to 
strategically plan for those situations. The findings from the study revealed that small 
business’ responsiveness to problems during the recovery phase is a synthesis of the 
ability or experience of the owner and on the support available from outside 
organizations.  
E. FINANCIAL INCENTIVES—BUREAUCRATIC HURDLES  
Small business entrepreneurs comprise a significant portion of most local 
economies. However, tax policies, government regulation, or even excessive paperwork 
demands can disproportionately affect them.110 While a catastrophic event may cause 
immediate but temporary disruption to the daily pattern of life in a community, the same 
circumstances may cause immediate and permanent disruption to small businesses. 
Consider that in the past 20 years, starting with the Clinton administration to President 
Obama, presidential disaster declarations number 2,325.111 The large number of disaster 
declarations affects a high number of employers, since if one were to put all small 
businesses together they comprise the largest employer in the nation. The SBA figures 
indicate that 27 million small businesses employ nearly 60 million people as of 2010,112 
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which represents 99.7 percent of all employer firms113 and creates 64 percent of net new 
jobs between 1993 and 2011.114 This situation indicates with considerable clarity the 
need to attend more to operational continuity for small businesses when a disaster 
interferes. Otherwise, the significant proportion of the economy that small business 
represents is left to founder, weak and almost helpless.  
Not only does the collapse of small businesses after a disaster wreak havoc on the 
small business owners themselves, but after a disaster, business relocation and the ill 
effects on municipal budgets due to a diminished tax base is a major problem. For 
instance, after an earthquake, the city of Santa Cruz provided temporary shelters for 
businesses. Those businesses operated for up to three years in these temporary structures 
while storefronts were built.115 See Figures 3 and 4. 
Figure 3.  Pavilions as Temporary Housing for Local Businesses 
 
Seven pavilions were erected with volunteer help from the Carpenter’s and local unions 
while private companies donated materials and labor. Photographs courtesy of the City of 
Santa Cruz Public Works Department and Ray Sherrod. Source: “Remembering the 1989 
Loma Prieta Earthquake,” 1989, http://www2.santacruzpl.org/gallery2/v/1989quake/ 
rs007.jpg.html and http://www2.santacruzpl.org/gallery2/v/1989quake/Pw-016.jpg.html. 
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Figure 4.  Rebuilding of Downtown Santa Cruz 
 
Source: “On Solid Ground, How Good Land Use Planning Can Prepare the Bay Area for 
a Strong Disaster Recovery,” February 2013, 18, http://www.spur.org/sites/default/ 
files/publications_pdfs/SPUR_On_Solid_Ground.pdf. 
In contrast, in the post-earthquake city of Watsonville (near Santa Cruz), many 
businesses moved to temporary quarters. A senior Watsonville official stated, “these 
business relocations continue to hamper the recovery of the downtown district almost two 
decades after the earthquake.”116  
Similarly, revisiting Senator Landrieu’s inquiry into the 40 percent of small 
businesses failing after a disaster and what can be done to mitigate those failures117 leads 
inevitably to the bureaucratic hurdles and complicated filing process by the SBA and 
FEMA. Since most of the funds available from the federal government come in the form 
of loans administered by the SBA, the process can be cumbersome due to the lengthy 
application process, different documentation requirements, and technical language. Corey 
and Deitch point to Runyon’s work, in which small businesses “complained that the SBA 
was asking for three years’ worth of financial statements and tax returns, and how the 
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process for receiving an SBA loan after Hurricane Katrina was too slow, with fewer than 
one percent of the 66,819 emergency loan applications sent to the SBA receiving 
approval.”118 
Nevertheless, after a score of issues relating to paperwork after Hurricane Katrina, 
FEMA created an easier way to help expedite the application process through the disaster 
acquisition response teams (DARTs).119 DARTs are made up of contracting officers who 
have had training and experience in post-award executing contracts and engage with the 
local business community to identify products and services that can be provided locally, 
as well as providing on-the-spot technical assistance to small businesses. For instance, in 
Joplin, Missouri, DART members worked with the affected local businesses to comply 
with the eligibility requirements. A FEMA administrator commented, “Not only was this 
an opportunity for this business to contract with FEMA, but it was also a chance for this 
business to gain skills and approvals needed to successfully compete for government 
contracts in the future.”120 Similarly, in Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, and 
Georgia, over 13 million dollars were awarded to local businesses and 90 percent of the 
local procurement initiatives went to small businesses.121 The DART is an important 
lesson learned from past disasters and an added value for small businesses, as they might 
not be well versed in federal contracting practices.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Planners and policy specialists will need to address a number of key 
considerations to engage small business owners in pro-active preparation for disasters. 
Components within the government already exist to support the challenges of business 
disruption. Nevertheless, a whole team that reflects the interest of the community can 
find ways to support and strengthen existing networks before an incident occurs.  
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Local officeholders and responders will need to overcome concerns about 
oversight, budget constraints, and other practical barriers to achieve resilience. Incentives 
for small business engagement, including the deployment of best practices during a 
disaster response to show the value of both resiliency and public-private partnership, may 
be necessary to move small businesses toward deeper engagement and a commitment to 
continuity planning. Those issues are explored in the next section. 
  
 44 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 45 
III. PARTNERSHIPS AND PERSPECTIVES  
The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable man 
persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all progress 
depends on the unreasonable man. 
~ George Bernard Shaw,  
Irish playwright and Nobel Prize winner  
 
This chapter explores perspectives shaping policy to augment current mitigation 
and preparedness efforts while examining partnerships from recent disasters or initiatives 
based on a more comprehensive approach to align resources and stakeholders. These 
interrelated functions synch policy and practice, and serve as the framework from which 
the theoretical proposed model is derived. 
A. PERSPECTIVES  
This section analyzes the evolution of understanding the conceptual structures that 
have demonstrated relevance to disaster response studies. Newer conceptual structures, 
such as business continuity planning offer intriguing solutions to older and persistent 
problems. Many sources are informative, such as the sections of the 9/11 Commission 
report that relate to private sector resilience, response, and preparedness.  
The word “perspective” is a compound from Greek sources, and means “through-
seeing” in its root structure. Put another way, “where you stand depends on where you 
sit.”122 This chapter offers some methods to enhance resilience using existing resources 
within the homeland security penumbra.  
1. Contingency Planning 
In business, a disruptive event is inevitable. 
Since the middle of the 20th century, “private business organizations have taken 
an increasing interest in emergency management, especially as it relates to their own 
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business continuity.”123 More actors on the continuum of emergency management are 
delving deeper into contingency planning, crisis management, emergency response, and 
risk management. For instance, the concepts of emergency management and business 
continuity planning (BCP) (referred to as “contingency planning”) have been integrated 
into DHS policies with the adoption of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 
1600 National Preparedness. Title IX of Public Law 110-53 implemented the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission on private sector preparedness, which targeted 
all hazards to business emergency preparedness and continuity.124  
The NFPA 1600 was a private/public sector strategic function to address the role 
of responsibilities and contributions in the private sector, and has evolved into the 
National Preparedness Standard. Contingency planning becomes key for any organization 
that wants to survive and prosper, which ultimately gives it an edge to the business. 
Under the 21st century challenges and the evolving threat landscape from terrorist 
attacks, pandemics, rising cost of natural disasters and cyber crime, more institutions are 
considering contingency planning to help protect their bottom line.  
Further coordination becomes key since the interdependencies and escalating 
effects of an event have greater impact on the 16 critical infrastructure sectors,125 and 
global interdependencies need to be better integrated across a diverse set of plans and 
structures. However, an often-cited challenge for organizations has been the lack of 
expertise in the implementation of contingency planning to bridge a cultural shift in terms 
of strategic plans.126  
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Innovative contingency planning provides a more holistic combination of 
emergency management and business continuity anticipation by combining it into a 
model of proactive planning, preparedness, and mitigation. Although a no one-size-fits-
all approach to developing more resilient business community exists, those businesses 
that identify risk and have a plan on how to encounter it may be better poised to respond 
accordingly and align resources. Moreover, under the fiscal constraints affecting 
municipal and state governments, this planning foresight is an added benefit since the 
jurisdiction is proactively and strategically engaging in preparedness or mitigation 
efforts. For instance, at the local level, the hazard identification and risk assessment and 
consequence analysis, and at the state level, the THIRA, are shaping policy to integrate 
the whole community and whole of government. The THIRA, in particular, provides a 
comprehensive alignment that not only focuses on the economic development component 
at the national level but incorporates regional and state concerns while targeting public 
and private partnerships to assist in the development of programs to enhance overall 
resilience.  
Resources may or may not be present to meet community needs. Identifying 
needs is a sine qua non of authentic dialogue.  
However, a diverse group of community members can challenge participation 
coordinators. Furthermore, contingency planning is used throughout the world, from 
transnational corporations to small and medium sized businesses. For instance, the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) stands as the 
quintessential example of collaborative work, with 189 national societies, one in almost 
every country in the world. Underlying their processes is contingency planning and 
preparedness as a core organizational goal based on their knowledge and expertise in 
disaster recovery, relief, and public-private partnerships.  
In 2012, IFRC developed a contingency planning guide with the aim of 
supporting practitioners in developing simple plans, supported by preparedness actions 
and engaging. Organizational or entrepreneurial responses to events are undergirded by 
decisions, made in advance, about the management of different processes. These 
processes include human, financial, communication, resources, technical, and logistical 
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responses. Strategic planning on the part of the small business entrepreneur identifies the 
needs and processes involved in recovery, whether technical, security, insurance, or 
financial, providing a baseline of risk tolerance and time savings when an event occurs. 
The model used by IFRC includes three key questions, can be adapted to anything 
from a small corner store to a Fortune 500 company: 
• What is going to happen?  
• What can be done about it?  
• What can be done to prepare ahead of time?  
This anticipatory posture is a key feature. Similarly, this posture relates directly 
with the THIRA since the alignment process involves planning, mitigation, and economic 
development that will target public and private partnerships to assist in the development 
of programs to enhance overall resilience.  
2. The UK’s Disaster Preparedness and Resilience Practices 
The business engagement practices based on the model of government and 
business preparedness plans in place in the United Kingdom, and particularly in the 
United Kingdom’s Cabinet Office (UKCO), are interesting. The United Kingdom is the 
fourth largest economy in Europe. Three-quarters of its economic activity involves the 
service sector.127 For many reasons, the United Kingdom is an anomaly.128  
However, this anomaly has enhanced the country’s disaster preparedness and 
resilience practices, which has made the country a model to be emulated. Following 
incidents in preceding years to draw attention to the importance of a culture based on 
resilience planning, the Cabinet Office enacted the Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 
(CCA). CCA provides exigent measures for special legislative contingencies to deal with 
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the effects of incidents.129 For instance, the governance framework in the United 
Kingdom started with the 2004 CCA by requiring emergency responders in England and 
Wales to cooperate to maintain a public Community Risk Register. The Register 
delineates duties for small business including a duty to assess risk and to maintain 
emergency plans and promote business continuity.  
The primary goal of these efforts is to identify the relationship between planning 
and coordinating for emergencies at the local and federal level. In 2008, the National 
Security Strategy expanded its comprehensive effort to achieve resilience by creating a 
National Risk Register (NRR) and the National Risk Assessment (NRA). Both 
documents provide guidance to businesses in preparing for civil emergencies by drawing 
on expertise from several government agencies and departments on three broad 
categories: malicious attacks, major accidents, and natural events.130 The implementation 
is guided by local resilience forums interpreting the risk from NRA and NRR in helping 
with their local assessment while underpinning emergency planning throughout the 
country. Across England and Wales, more than 42 local resilience forums ensure the 
delivery of actions under the CCA including risk profiles for an area through a 
Community Risk Register for emergency planning and promotion of business related 
activities.131  
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3. BENS and The National Business Emergency Operations Center 
Entrepreneur Stanley A. Weiss founded the Business Executives for National 
Security (BENS) in 1982 as a non-profit, non-partisan organization dedicated to applying 
best business practices to national security problems. The organization is unique in that it 
advocated for greater partnerships so that government and industry could combine their 
strengths and protect institutions, private industry, and the general public from natural 
and manmade disasters across the five mission areas.132 However, some of the challenges 
BENS encountered can be summed in this quote,: “The premise is simple, and the 
implementation is difficult: Governors, state and local officials and private sector firms 
form working partnerships in various locales—strengthening relationships that transcend 
typical political and other boundaries of government and business relationships.”133  
In 2006, BENS was tasked by Congress to provide advice on how to build public-
private partnerships and make recommendations to integrate private sector competencies 
into a national disaster response. A Task Force was created to develop the report “Getting 
Down to Business: An Action Plan for Public-Private Disaster Response Coordination,” 
providing several areas of recommendation to include greater public-private collaboration 
from planning to implementation, and targeting the regulatory and legal environment to 
remove barriers and create a more predictable system.134  
While BENS was magnifying the value of public-private partnerships and the 
vital role of the private sector, at the federal level, the Post Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act enhanced regulatory frameworks under FEMA and added 
greater capability to incorporate the private sector including small businesses. This 
hindsight influenced the state and municipal level in a tangible way, with most 
emergency operations centers having a private sector component and several states 
creating business emergency operations centers (BEOCs) within current infrastructure to 
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enhance operational capabilities.135 For example, the Louisiana Business Emergency 
Operations Center (LA BEOC) combines the envisioned private sector involvement and 
academia including the Stephenson Disaster Management Institute, which established a 
Center for Business Preparedness to bridge the gap between research, business 
preparedness, and continuity of operations. Col. Booth from the Stephenson Institute 
stated, “We started looking at ways to exchange information with the private sector and 
work with them to help them back up to normal operations tempo as soon as possible.”136 
He stressed that it is of central importance to share lessons learned and then implement 
those lessons comprehensively.  
The LA BEOC has the capability of a virtual BEOC platform to facilitate 
collaboration. At the federal level, FEMA created the National Business Emergency 
Operations Center (NBEOC) to augment the shared vision of resilience by building on 
successful partnerships.137 The NBEOC was first activated in 2012 during Hurricane 
Isaac, and FEMA Administrator Fugate highlighted its successful role, stating “the 
NBEOC was incredibly well-received during response efforts from private sector 
stakeholders who applauded the communication and coordination gained through 
aggregation of multiple communications.”138 The NBEOC acts as a force multiplier by 
sharing information, clearing roadblocks, and connecting the dots by engaging 
stakeholders for resources, capabilities, or expertise in a decentralized approach so that 
businesses are backed up and running as quickly as possible.  
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During Hurricane Sandy, the NBEOC dispatched liaisons to the private sector in 
Connecticut, New York and New Jersey, and Connecticut.139 As the program continues, 
the challenge of managing expectations from both internal (FEMA) and external 
stakeholders will increase, as impacted regions will expect greater collaboration. 
Nevertheless, Deputy Associate Administrator Elizabeth Zimmerman cited that “only 
half of all US states have any type of private sector engagement for emergency 
management issues, and those efforts range widely in format, focus, level of effort, and 
sustainability.”140 Local governments appear aware of the need to engage small 
businesses, as private sector engagement at the state level is clearly lacking, as Ms. 
Zimmerman’s comments indicate.  
4. Florida—Emergency Support Function 18 
The state of Florida has been at the vanguard of adoption of initiatives that 
support local businesses, by modifying the federal emergency support functions (ESF) to 
create a plan that integrates the business sector into emergency management functions. At 
the emergency operations center, the state has enhanced operational capacities. Florida 
created ESF 18 when two counties came together to promote business continuity 
initiatives as the support function for business and industry. In Escambia County, the Be 
Ready Alliance Coordinating for Emergencies (BRACE) combined its preparedness 
committee with Santa Rosa County’s Support Alliance for Emergency Readiness 
(SAFER) and its business continuity committee. SAFER was created as a way to 
continue community engagement and build on the work of the Long Term Recovery 
Organization formed after Hurricanes Ivan and Dennis.  
To continue empowering the community, a plan was devised to create a 
Community Organization Active in Disasters, developed under the name SAFER. In 
2010, it was comprised of 115 member organizations with a mission to “foster efficient, 
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streamlined service delivery to people affected by disasters while eliminating 
unnecessary duplication of effort through cooperation in the four phases of disaster.”141 
ESF 18 combines core groups from both counties to develop plans and implement 
programs that support small businesses. For instance, both BRACE and SAFER have 
subcommittees including the preparedness committee, which provides resources to 
organizations and individuals in preparedness efforts, including training, business 
continuity, case management, and volunteer support. The Business Continuity committee 
assists preparedness efforts, such as continuity of operations, logistical support, response 
and recovery efforts, which are engaged when an event is occurring. Also, representatives 
from SAFER have a seat in the emergency operations centers and are able to capitalize 
on online resources, including WebEOC, tools, templates, and a newsletter to apprise the 
business sector and community at large. Nevertheless, a problem often encountered by 
organizations is how to continue year-around engagement. SAFER, when not dealing 
with a hurricane or a flood, contributes to the community through one of several 
subcommittees and ad-hoc groups.  
B. PARTNERSHIPS 
It appears that a unified community response is decisive in creating the somewhat 
ephemeral characteristic of “resilience,” with the additional benefit of lowering costs of 
recovery. The next section discusses the case study that demonstrates a community is 
capable of extraordinary self-care, the case of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, in response to a flood 
in 2008.  
In addition, this writer discusses the vital role of flexibility in response options. 
The Cedar Rapids case has many micro-lessons to teach about the importance of 
involving everyone, what has come to be called the “whole community” method, 
structure, or approach.  
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1. Leveraging Local Resources—Cedar Rapids Case  
Recovery involves the private sector in the preparedness and recovery of the 
communities where they live, work, and operate in a comprehensive “whole community” 
approach. Cedar Rapids, Iowa was successful in leveraging local resources, including the 
counseling and case management from SBA’s resource partners with comprehensive 
sources of assistance, including counseling, credit, capital, investment, contracting, 
federal, grants, and insurance, creating community confidence and recovery. When a 
flood hit Cedar Rapids in 2008, the city experienced more than six billion dollars in 
damages to businesses, housing, and the city’s infrastructure, which made it the fifth-
largest disaster in U.S. history.142  
Figure 5.  Cedar Rapids Flood Magnitude and Affected Businesses 
 
Source: The Cedar Rapids Area Chamber of Commerce, First Business Case 
Management Program for A Natural Disaster, Iowa (Cedar Rapids, IA: The Cedar 
Rapids Area Chamber of Commerce, 2012), 3. 
Two innovative aspects of the Cedar Rapids effort make it a best practice and an 
example that more communities should follow. The community created the first business 
case management program that provided wrap-around services to the community. The 
Cedar Rapids Small Business Recovery Group (CRSBRG) developed as a grassroots 
economy recovery team by providing direct one-on-one assistance to flood-affected 
businesses, addressing roadblocks, the need for resources, helping one another, and 
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providing a forum for business owners to voice concerns and share stories.143 Perhaps the 
most impressive statistic was that the wrap-around services provided by the case 
managers improved the survival rate of businesses from 45 percent to 82 percent 
compared to national statistics at the three-year mark.144 The team developed centralized 
damage assessment data and worked on developing a unified recovery strategy. Over a 
two-year period, a team of business professionals reached out to 1,230 businesses to 
determine flood status and recovery needs. For delivery of services, the team partnered 
with the SBA, Service Corps of Retired Executives (SCORE), SBDC, and the Safeguard 
Iowa Partnership to provide at least five engagements per business to a total of 565 
engagements.145 
The CRSBRG was also complemented by the creation of a Community Working 
Capital Fund, which was a valuable asset: 
Over $6,000,000 was distributed to 330+ small businesses that helped 
them meet payroll, pay for clean-up and other disaster expenses. Many 
business owners cited this early financial assistance program as having 
saved their business, which came at a time when cash was depleted, 
revenues were considerably down, and disaster loans had not yet been 
finalized. Many of these businesses were operating on the owners’ assets, 
which included cashing out investments and retirement accounts and use 
of personal credit cards.146 
Further analysis of the data ($6,000,000 divided by 330+ business) reveals that 
about $18,000 was allocated to each business. For a small business owner, this influx of 
cash makes a critical difference, sometimes the difference between survival and its 
alternative.  
When dealing with such a fund, oversight is key since tension will occur from 
competing factors, and a fair structure and competent management will take precedence. 
For recipients, if funding has been exhausted, some might not be approved, which could 
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have dire consequences if this funding is their last resort. For investors and donors, the 
expectation is that their contributions are being effectively and efficiently utilized and 
that the process is transparent as possible.  
A working capital fund for small businesses to access credit appears as the single 
most useful incentive that can be applied to fill the gaps in the economic recovery of the 
local community. Long-term disaster recovery requires economic development efforts at 
the community level. Reducing economic vulnerability through technical assistance 
enhances resiliency. Proper oversight is a critical element that allows communities to 
work through that process in a decentralized manner. 
2. Resilience in Economic Development Planning  
Along with the Cedar Rapids model, guidance released from the U.S. Economic 
Development Administration (EDA) on resilience in economic development planning 
from Colorado federally declared disaster 4145 provides helpful clues for both pre-and 
post-disaster environments. In September 2013, Colorado experienced extensive floods 
and landslides covering over eight jurisdictions (more than a third of the state), a death 
toll of 10 lives that resulted in the largest domestic evacuation since Hurricane 
Katrina.147 Under the NDRF, six recovery support functions (RSF) that oversee and 
partner with other federal agencies to provide training, grants, or technical assistance; 
with the EDA is the lead agency for the economic RSF.  
The Colorado process revolved around three key activities. The first is a team 
aggregating many years of disaster recovery experience, and guided by “best practices” 
approach (in disaster mitigation, economic recoveries, and resilience issues) synthesized 
a metric. The metric considers aspects of economic mitigation, preparedness, and 
recovery within 52 components that were used to review plans in the hardest-hit areas to 
identify the features that would highlight resiliency efforts.  
Second, the metric helped when reviewing local plans to identify trends and best 
practices documenting the “magic,” major strategies and initiatives for supporting 
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economic recovery for jurisdictions. As part of the effort, the economic RSF teams 
developed a “mission scoping assessment.” The mission scoping assessment allows for a 
more ample understanding of the impact of a disaster by focusing on recovery challenges. 
Also, assessed are the short-term, intermediate and long-term capabilities of the local 
government, state, and private sector partners to sustain recovery efforts. The assessment 
provided a starting point for the development of a strategy based on assumptions derived 
from efforts to encourage economic development. The assessment helped organize the 
preliminary list of 80 affected municipalities into 25, within five larger regions. 
Nevertheless, not all 25 communities were able to participate. Some lacked personnel 
resources; some were constraint by time.148 However, for the identified regions, plans 
were rated into three categories: “not observed, “partially observed,” or “fully observed.”  
Figure 6 illustrates the average percent of resilient metrics items rated as 
observed, partially observed, or fully observed:  
Figure 6.  Average Percentage of Resilience Metric Components by Rating 
 
Source: U.S. Economic Development Administration, Resilience in Economic 
Development Planning: Colorado Flooding: DR 4145 (Washington, DC: U.S. Economic 
Development Administration, 2014), 10. 
Lastly, plans were drafted to share the results of the plan reviews and 
recommendations were made for incorporating resilience into planning and recovery 
activities. It is worth noting that the majority of the businesses impacted in the five 
regions surveyed dealt primarily with small businesses. Consequently, the findings are 
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congruent with drawbacks mentioned during the literature review that included lacking 
overall business and management capacity, with relative few capital and disaster 
preparedness strategies or methods preserving business continuity in place.149  
One of the most helpful clues from the mission scoping assessment tool and 
analysis of a recent catastrophe is that most participating communities expressed 
enthusiasm for the concept of economic resilience and want to learn more about how to 
incorporate it into their efforts. The 11 areas for economic resilience are illustrated in 
Figure 7. 
Figure 7.  Metric Area Evaluations Summary 
 
Source: U.S. Economic Development Administration, Resilience in Economic 
Development Planning: Colorado Flooding: DR 4145 (Washington, DC: U.S. Economic 
Development Administration, 2014), 11. 
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Although all 11 factors are quite important, the most relevant to this thesis are 
planning, governance, financing, business continuity, counseling and technical assistance 
and communications systems. Some of the findings from the study suggest that plans did 
not address resilience factors, and “the concept of economic resilience is not fully 
understood by local economic development practitioners—an observation probably 
nationally applicable and not unique to Colorado.”150  
3. The City Resilience Framework  
“100 Resilient Cities” is the philanthropic initiative that looks at a global 
perspective of making the world better by taking into account urban planning, climate 
change, and resilience for a more sustainable future. By 2012, the idea of resilience had 
expanded globally beyond climate change to include reduction of risk, financial strains, 
infrastructure issues, and assisting businesses to continue.151 This approach has enabled a 
comprehensive framework for 100 cities around the world, which created a baseline on 
the key elements that will make these cities more resilient. As always, national security 
issues also can provide perspective. 
The word “resilience” was given a new meaning in the 1970s, expanding through 
a metaphor its connotations of elasticity and a capacity to resume a former state or shape 
“to describe the capacity of a system to maintain or recover functionality in the event of a 
disruption or disturbance.”152 The concept applies to intersecting systems. Under the City 
Resilience Framework, asset-based approaches are shortsighted and a focus on intangible 
assets, such as culture, social networks, and knowledge, takes a much-needed longer 
perspective. Thus, resilience should focus on abetting the performance of the overall 
system when dealing with disruption. Asset-loss prevention is “fighting the last war,” as 
opposed to looking forward.153  
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To create a grounded framework, the Rockefeller Foundation selected six 
geographically diverse that either had suffered a major event or were addressing stresses 
that included Semarang, Indonesia; Surat, India; Concepcion, Chile; Cape Town, South 
Africa; and New Orleans, USA. The data identified 1,546 factors, physical and 
nonphysical, that contributed to the resilience of the cities among 12 different themes. Of 
those themes, “information and knowledge management” and “urban strategy and 
planning economic sustainability” are the most relevant to this paper, followed closely by 
“business support” and “strong social networks/social stability” and security, including 
law enforcement and emergency management. Perhaps more importantly, the availability 
of financial resources and contingency funds was critical to attract businesses and provide 
access to an emergency fund. 
The framework analysis highlighted the responsibilities the private sector and city 
government share. “The private sector has a complementary responsibility to develop 
business continuity plans to ensure that businesses can also function during, and recover 
from, emergencies.”154 However, city governments can enhance public safety by 
maintaining dialogue and strengthening networks between participants.155  
One of the overall findings was that resilient cities are resourceful and able to 
access funds through grants from non-governmental and business sources. However, a 
sub-indicator that underpins this area is business continuity planning. The continuity of 
critical services can only be enhanced by cross-sector collaboration that aligns multiple 
stakeholders, including the private sector and, where they exist, universities to solve city 
problems. 
The framework aims to capitalize on sharing knowledge and “best practices.” 
Research shows a correlation between a city’s overall competitiveness and its resilience 
to climate risk.156 For Surat, India, which is highly dependent on the diamond and textile 
industries, the exposure and vulnerability to heat stress, drought, and flooding can 
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certainly undermine productivity. One of the activities mentioned in the report was the 
participation of chambers-of-commerce (the traditional locus of public/private dialogues). 
This approach empowers advocates by making resources accessible, and provides 
opportunities to the business community by making them active partners in recovery.  
Under the City Resilience Framework, a resilience and competitiveness ranking 
leverages private assets and government towards efforts to address disaster planning and 
climate risk. Besides the ranking, the resilience framework combines the ground 
managers to advocate and coordinate activities called chief resilience officers. For 
instance, the chief resilience officer for the city of San Francisco discussed in an 
emergency management article that is not just about retrofitting buildings, but also taking 
an approach that looks at social and economic components. He noted the 7,000 people 
employed by the city’s 2,300 small businesses work in buildings that “may not have 
continuity insurance or a viable way to recover.”157  
As a resilience officer, his goal is to connect with the right groups and resources 
so that the entire network is involved. The program aims to create comprehensive long-
term recovery plans that combine the private sector, including business continuity, and 
also to participate in a resilient plan. He states, “They’ll ask, ‘Why should I do that?’ I’ll 
say, ‘What does it cost to be out of business for a day, a week, a month.’ The math is 
simple: every dollar spent now saves four after a disaster.”158 
C. CONCLUSION 
Work on disaster resilience is not a new concept. Systemic innovations embrace 
the elements of essential intangibles, and convey the growing adaptation of systems to 
large-scale risks. The perspectives advanced by the BENS partnership/collaboration 
provided a set of recommendations to Congress spearheading greater public/private 
partnerships that can include the creation of local business emergency operations centers, 
and a national emergency operation center most recently used during Hurricane Sandy. 
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Similarly, in Western Europe, the United Kingdom is marshaling interdependent 
systems based on metrics, assessments, and collaboration to work in tandem for small 
business entrepreneurs aligning resources during future challenges. However, 
government intervention is usually insufficient for a robust recovery. The partnerships 
models used in Florida, Cedar Rapids and Colorado included local groups and resources 
to help communities with residential, operational, and workplace challenges. The 
philanthropic collaboration involving the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Cities analyzes 
information and knowledge management, and economic sustainability, and views 
business support and social networks as active participants. 
All these frameworks are adapting to the continuing operating environment, and 
embedding resilience. Resilience includes a belief system—optimism that recovery is 
essential and possible—interacting with facts, the on-the-ground information. Preparation 
with resilience first involves addressing the stark reality that the prospect of a disruption 
is inevitable. All these perspectives and partnerships practices confront questions of how 
to create a culture of preparedness. Researchers are familiar with the principle that it is 
more cost-effective to prevent or mitigate the impacts of disaster through comprehensive 
efforts than it is to respond and recover. Political leaders, to say nothing of the general 
public, may have a less informed understanding. Although the NFPA is the established 
standard addressing contingency planning and preparedness, that agency is still adapting 
to the National Planning Frameworks.  
Consequently, the moment is ripe with an emerging trend recognizing the need to 
enhance resilience through business preparedness (i.e., private/public preparation 
partnership). Recommending alternatives for implementation increases the nation’s 
ability to renew normalcy and resume activity after a disaster. Such a model increases 
small business enterprises’ capacity, improves the concept of an organization-wide 
continuity culture, and offers alternative economic planning options in light of potentially 
diminishing state and federal resources. 
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IV. PROPOSED MODEL 
The previous chapters reviewed some of the complexities and challenges facing 
small business entrepreneurs and explored the contribution of different perspectives and 
partnerships on the rise. The adoption of all these frameworks combines lessons learned, 
and presents a more comprehensive approach to mitigation and preparedness efforts. It 
seems momentum is growing to address some of the many issues adumbrated throughout 
this work. This chapter delves into the current state of affairs of disaster preparedness and 
response and advances a model based on entrepreneurial principles to leverage what the 
writer coined the “hat trick approach” to enhance resilience. This approach combines 
community asset mapping, social network analysis and scenario planning; all readily 
available products to enhance the preparedness and disaster management cycle.  
A. LIMITATIONS IN DISASTER PREPAREDNESS WITHIN U.S. SMALL-
BUSINESS ENTREPRENEURS 
In 2011, PPD-8 was enacted to strengthen the resilience of the nation, by 
optimizing available resources through National Planning Frameworks covering the 
preparedness mission areas describing how the “whole community” works together to 
achieve a resilient nation. Two primary driving factors are behind the National Planning 
Frameworks, public safety and economic development/recovery. Both are intended to 
improve public welfare by encouraging resilience.  
U.S. policy and practices have shifted to be more inclusive by subscribing to an 
all-hazards approach to preparedness, response, and assessing a new category, resilience. 
The anticipation of threats is more possible than previously believed. A thorough analysis 
of response addresses outcomes regardless of the source of threat. However, in each of 
these areas, aligning policy and implementation has been a key challenge, especially 
given the constant changing operational environment.  
“Disaster relief” responsibility is diffused among several federal agencies 
including FEMA and the SBA. Once the President (or, at times, an SBA administrator) 
issues a declaration, credit is extended through government programs. FEMA also can 
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provide housing grants or sometimes housing (the famous FEMA trailer). FEMA housing 
allowances are sometimes renewable. This linear approach fails to consider or include 
how small business owners/entrepreneurs are part of the overall preparedness goal and 
their role (if any) in preparedness or mitigation.  
B. PROPOSED MODEL—WRAP-AROUND SERVICES BUSINESS 
INCUBATOR 
Numerous illustrations demonstrate how small business owners are at an inherent, 
definitional disadvantage when it comes to disaster preparedness. Whether the setbacks 
come from flaws in the current frameworks, psychological factors, lack of planning, 
capacity, wrong messaging, or the need to incorporate new models, the reality is that the 
current situation is unsustainable, and thus, a “paradigm” has to be “shifted” by 
stakeholders. Paradigms do not shift themselves. The “perspectives and partnerships” 
section highlighted how many entities are, at present, working on components of 
resilience. Current efforts appear fragmented, or outside of the scope of small business 
entrepreneurs. Thus, the challenge remains as to how to coordinate resources, community 
assets, and technology to improve on the concerted efforts and emerging trend.  
The small business incubator “wrap-around services” model is aimed at a 
conceptual restructuring that places the burden (back, in many, if not most cases) on 
small businesses for their own survival. Since “disaster policy in the United States 
continues to be reactive,”159 the problem has been clear. Those entities that do not have 
mitigation (short-, and long-term strategies) added to preparedness efforts from the onset 
have and/or will suffer avoidable adverse consequences. In order to improve the nation’s 
resilience to disasters, the model proposed would proactively build preparedness into pre-
existing frameworks. This arrangement allows for the model to tap into expertise and 
resources at the federal level and adapt knowledge of specific jurisdictional 
circumstances and capabilities at the local level. Some of the aims of the project would be 
to:  
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• Improve disaster response and self-sufficiency; thereby, reducing reliance 
on costly federal and state services;  
• Establish strong relationships and improve communications. These 
communications are critical between sectors at all times in a disaster;  
• Provide a venue for business collaboration and communications; and 
• Increase preparedness and situational awareness; thereby, mitigating 
possible disruptions.  
However, several steps would need to take place to accomplish these tasks. The 
dissertation, “Louisiana Small Business Owners Stated Problems during Recovery from 
Hurricane Katrina: Outsider Assistance within a Dynamic Environment,” was accurate, 
or prescient.160 Escudier theorized small business owners would seek outside assistance 
once they reached the maximum point of stress. The work identified the lack of capacity 
of small business owners. It calls for a shift to involve pre-existing networks and 
relationships in a more comprehensive approach to disaster preparedness. For the new 
model to succeed, it has to build tangible results with intangible enhancements. 
Innovative public/private partnerships systems will probably combine the recognition of 
existing local cultural assets and traditions with embracing technology.  
This model proposes adding a mitigation layer to the current framework of 
assistance. This writer has worked with multiple frameworks used by the SBA resource 
partners (Center for Women and Enterprise (CWE), SBDC, and SCORE). Based on 
experience and observations, a key flaw in practice in the current framework is the 
reactive, ad-hoc support structure. For instance, the resource partners’ counselor provides 
guidance to small business owners to make more informed decisions in several areas, 
including writing a business plan, financial literacy, accounting basics, social media, and 
best practices. Also, a client’s profile is reviewed and assessed based on the existing 
business plan and financial acuity. It involves a combination of assessments addressing 
threats, gaps, and capabilities to ensure that a solid and flexible business plan is in place.  
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However, no risk assessment, mitigation efforts, or education related to 
contingency planning is presented at any point until disaster strikes or funding becomes 
available due to a disaster. It is a major flaw and a missed opportunity to increase 
preparedness and capacity, since the small business entrepreneur is already engaged in 
the process. It is in the best interest of partners to provide preparedness training or 
materials, so that the client understands how small business entrepreneurs can become 
part of the solution by understanding the role to play in preparedness and how business 
continuity can make a difference.  
Under the envisioned new model of action, mitigation and preparedness would be 
part of the services provided by the state or local jurisdiction’s economic development 
agency with the local emergency management agency and private partners including 
local chamber coalitions, and related small business groups. These entities are nurtured 
through SBA’s business counseling and outside resources to small business 
entrepreneurs. By aligning mitigation planning from the onset with planning divisions or 
departments, the federal entity supports the local capacity building and preparedness 
efforts; thereby, becoming part of the culture of doing business.  
The proposed model would combine lessons learned and successful and/or 
instructive partnerships, including the Cedar Rapids and Colorado cases, public-private 
partnerships, and incentives. Cedar Rapids was unique in that it was able to leverage a 
community alliance to bring back businesses on the brink of bankruptcy to exceed all 
expectations, and more importantly, create community confidence and resilience.161 
However, a major drawback with the Cedar Rapids case is that, in light of the fiscal 
realities facing government, duplicative or even similar it will take a broad partner 
coalition. The broad partner collaboration needed is similar to the structure used in the 
Colorado Flooding case, as an applicable tool for communities, state, and federal 
agencies to encourage translating knowledge into practice.  
In Rhode Island following Hurricane Sandy, the NDRF was used when the state 
and FEMA marshaled federal resources. It built recovery capacity, and created a 
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“community recovery task force” charged with build long-term recovery capacity. State 
and local levels improved resiliency by developing a state disaster recovery framework, 
aligned with the NDRF that fulfilled the recovery functions under PPD-8.  
The components that facilitated the framework were a broad partner network 
comprised of a broad group of government actors, the non-profit sector, and private 
industry. Some of the resources that these groups would leverage included funding, 
human capital, donated goods or services, supplies, equipment, space, subject matter 
expertise, technical assistance, viable information, and opportunities to share best 
practices.  
Once established, the stakeholders would work together to develop 
comprehensive recovery strategies that address disaster recovery issues for all functional 
areas.162 Effective strategies provide for partner collaboration, socializing norms of self-
sufficiency behaviors in response, and building resilience. In the envisioned model, the 
infrastructure built by the task force would be in the background supporting the efforts of 
small business entrepreneurs, but the preparedness and planning would be aligned from 
the onset. The approach works from the ground up, aligning with PPD-8 to look at a 
comprehensive way of improving preparedness and resilience based on state and local 
interdependencies, but supported by federal agencies including FEMA, SBA, EDA, and 
the third sector, including philanthropy.  
This proposed model conceives entrepreneurs exploring, and then wielding 
preparedness as a tool. Survival capacity, especially of assets like data, expands through a 
similar concept of business incubators. Business incubators coordinate multiple assets. 
According to the National Business Incubation Association, business incubation quickens 
the growth of businesses with hands-on advice, or tactical support, such as office space or 
access to equipment or supplies.163 Facilitating the growth of firms, their “graduates” 
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have a sustainability plan and help to create jobs, engage the community, and strengthen 
local economies. Empirical evidence suggests that incubators have succeeded in 
stabilizing small businesses and stimulating the local economy.164  
Some of the intangible benefits from small business incubators include cross-
fertilization of ideas, sharing of business practices, new methods, and technology. For 
instance, after the 1989 earthquake, Watsonville, California, used federal and state 
support to recruit and economically support a major retail department and other small 
businesses, including the creation of a non-profit small business incubator with grant 
money to facilitate small business start-ups in the business district.165 According to Steve 
Blank,166 “No business plan survives first contact with customers.”167  
Business plans are conceived, expressed on paper, and might be powered by a 
great idea. The same plans may also be full of hypotheses and guesses. However, as 
previously mentioned, a business incubator model provides practical wrap-around 
services based on information from business owners to aid the researcher’s answer to 
several of the questions similar to the startups implementation phase that could be 
changed to achieve a better product. It is more commonly known as pivot (major change 
to one or more elements of the business model) or iterate (repeat, but with a small 
adjustment). The likelihood that a business will fare better than a business with no 
contingency planning is increased.  
Furthermore, similar to a business incubator, the envisioned model would provide 
hands-on support through wrap-around services in general categories, such as accounting, 
and business plan development. Plans involve technology, and perhaps even social 
media. However, as the word “focus” means “hearth” in its original form, the focus 
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would be on preparedness and business continuity planning as the hearth of the village, 
the origin of trade, the sine qua non of social vitality. The setup of wrap-around services 
aligned with preparedness efforts is helpful towards planning because systems otherwise 
prohibitive to small business entrepreneurs become available. The added value is that 
these resources combine science-based capacity with community awareness goals.  
It appears techno-metric risk mitigation reduces community vulnerabilities to 
economic or other environmental challenges. One of the reasons cited for small 
businesses vulnerability to disasters is the lack of adaptive business management 
models.168 As mentioned in the problem space section, small business entrepreneurs face 
cultural, organizational (planning), and bureaucratic hurdles, as well as financial 
restrictions that impede the use of technology-based measures to enable greater 
integration. Nevertheless, similar to a business incubator, small business entrepreneurs 
could use science-based tools including social network analysis, community asset 
mapping, and scenario mapping to harness innovation consistent with the growing 
importance of information sharing. 
C. PROMOTING RESILIENCE THROUGH THE HAT TRICK APPROACH: 
SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS, COMMUNITY ASSET MAPPING, AND 
SCENARIO PLANNING 
When the word “resilience” is subjected to scrutiny, its pivotal metaphor is found 
to be active. The word means “to jump again,” to return promptly to a former state.  
Every community is different. Cedar Rapids displayed extraordinary unity and 
cooperation when disaster struck while New Orleans revealed deep divisions and 
institutional failures. This writer has found that understanding any community is 
necessary to any kind meaningful scenario planning. Likewise, scenario planning has to 
integrate any and all community assets. In turn, this writer has discovered, the community 
asset mapping is incomplete without a social network analysis.  
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To convey the urgency (which is packed into the word resilience already) of 
disaster preparation, this writer has settled on the term “hat trick” to evoke images of 
effort and accomplishment. In the following paragraphs, the need for a flexible 
combination of these three components is discussed.  
1. Social Network Analysis  
The affected community becomes the frontier of disaster relief. Communities 
have multiple pre-existing frame- and networks. Networks are increasingly prominent 
features in the organization of post-disaster economies following the envisioned 
decentralized approach established by the National Response Framework.169 Small 
business entrepreneurs are far from a homogeneous group. If a metaphor is necessary, 
perhaps the kaleidoscope is closest. Their makeup is comprised of nearly 7.8 million 
women owners, and 6.1 million minority owners.170 Moreover, 61.6 percent of workers 
have a disability, and 62.7 percent of the small business workforce has a high school 
education or less.171  
“Social Network Analysis” (SNA) theorizes and provides methods that provide 
empirical content to social context.172 As the DHS broadened its responsiveness in 
response to Hurricane Katrina, early as 2009, the National Research Council, at the 
request of the DHS, was seeking guidance on the applications of Social Network 
Analysis for the purposes of enhancing civilian “resilience.”173 The methods of SNA in 
community disaster resilience would help in the identification, strengthening, and 
construction of networks with the specific purpose of creating a baseline. It would also 
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address knowledge gaps and expand research applicability to provide more flexible 
approaches to intervene at the different phases of the cycles. Emergencies and disasters 
cause chaos, and flexibility is vital for any attempts at management. 
One of the highlights of the 2009 engagement by stakeholders was that “SNA is 
not being applied in ways that help local communities and practitioners.”174 However, in 
the rapid technological realm, the work with SNA is nascent and can be leveraged to take 
proactive decisions based on readily available resources. For instance, SNA can be 
leveraged to collect data to assess patterns and trends, including monitoring change for 
broader engagement, identifying critical sectors through geospatial analysis, and 
providing programs and services for a community.  
Applying these concepts to the Colorado flood disaster, SNA could have been 
leveraged to comply with the demands of the supply chain management to align local 
vendors and resources within affected jurisdictions. In the hypothetical example, 
situational awareness would be greatly improved and allow the small business prototype 
wrap-around service model to understand and measure the status of networks within their 
communities.  
Much of the current social network launched in the 1930s. However, the Pentagon 
moved in this direction in the 1990s with concerns about Al Qaeda’s growing influence. 
The attacks within the United States in 1993, and later on the USS Cole, heighten a 
public awareness of national security. The value of social network theory is its 
explanatory and predictive capacities.175 In disaster management, a premium is placed on 
the awareness of local vulnerabilities, needs, and resources.176 The use of SNA with 
small business incubators would offer a strategic vision by drawing on a broader field of 
network science, agent-based models, and analytically enhanced standard methods.  
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For instance, in “Applications of Social Network Analysis for Building 
Community Disaster,” the data pinpoints vulnerabilities, as illustrated by connecting all 
possible emergency responses in a community to actual response. The data gathered 
increases situational awareness of vulnerabilities within a geographic area. Emergency 
managers, economic development practitioners, and the community at large, will have to 
make more informed decisions about sustainability and mitigation. Furthermore, at the 
local level, the data collected augments the hazard identification and risk analysis to 
enhance the understanding of trends and aid in finding tactical solutions.  
In turn, the information moves up the hierarchy to the state, and ultimately, 
FEMA in conjunction with local stakeholders to provide a more comprehensive THIRA. 
THIRA supports a risk based planning process for jurisdictions in which local officials 
and partners have identified threat and hazards scenarios of particular concern to the 
region. After identifying the region’s core capabilities, the model estimates the scenarios’ 
projected damages. Then, with identified target goals for each core capability, the model 
sets set core targets. Equipped with this data, policy makers (at all levels) can introduce 
legislative and/or regulatory changes to enhance the government response to the 
(sometimes abrupt) needs of the community. However, it is unknown whether a baseline 
information of data about the network and their members exists.177 Nevertheless, the 
inclusion of the relationships and attributes of SNA could foster resilience and build 
capacity for local small business entrepreneurs to be prepared for inevitable disruptions. 
Also, planning in the long-range for sustainable development can become easier.  
2. Community Asset Mapping 
Another science-based and innovative tool that can be combined with the benefits 
of SNA is the use of community asset mapping. John P. Kretzman and John L. McKnight 
argued that all people and all communities are skillful, creative, and capable and 
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pioneered this community development philosophy.178 The approach aims to build 
communities by mobilizing and using assets to develop a plan to solve problems, improve 
quality of life, and build resilient communities by honing effectiveness, building on assets 
present in the community, and fostering connections between individuals and 
organizations.  
For instance, UCLA’s Center for Health Policy Research published a community 
asset-mapping guide that highlights four distinct advantages to using community asset 
mapping, including that it builds current resources based on strengths and community 
resilience. Data can be used to enhance projects, fill gaps, develop, or improve services, 
including funding, and it empowers the community to participate to help uncover 
solutions.179 All this information is helpful when starting a new program, and can 
provide better awareness of available resources and gaps. Furthermore, when dealing 
with a natural or man-made disaster, this community knowledge can help local resources 
push information to small business entrepreneurs to raise awareness about the availability 
of resources, share services, and improve capacity. At the state or local level, it can help 
coordinate the development and implementation of state post-disaster action plans, 
including the management of funding, innovative financing alternatives, and other 
resources for recovery and redevelopment.  
At both levels, the added value is that this system can generate lots of 
participation (community knowledge) and improves stakeholders’ buy-in. It also can 
increase the capacity within the community to care for its residents through strategic 
planning and community mobilizations. The theory includes the SoVI and its enhanced 
assessment of community capabilities and resources as a more comprehensive tool. 
However, drawbacks include the expense of the equipment, the generation of maps, and 
staffing.  
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The Rockefeller Foundation’s chief resilient officer (CRO) for Norfolk, Virginia 
has an approach to disaster resilience that is quite congruent with the concept of 
community asset mapping. The CRO is dealing with water and poverty through a whole 
community approach. His responsibility is to utilize “the Rockefeller framework … to 
understand the community, assess its strengths and weakness, and then address each 
appropriately.”180 Also, the CRO is empowering the community to configure their 
personalized definition of resilience, notwithstanding the framework envisioned by the 
Rockefeller Foundation for the community to truly “own” the process. The 
philanthropist’s ambition: “transform a well managed government into a well managed 
and resilient one going forward 20, 50, even 100 years.”181 However, he cautions that to 
realize this transformation, all community members must know their importance as a 
stakeholder. This means participation “from the bottom up.” This empowerment 
perspective is the type of cultural shift that will hopefully be achieved by accessing data 
and expertise.  
3. Scenario Planning 
In attempting to confront potentially dangerous uncertainty, scenario planning 
offers the business world a readiness model.182 Its roots come from military strategy 
studies under Herman Kahn in his work related to thermonuclear war.183 According to 
FEMA’s Strategic Foresight Initiative, scenario planning is a method used by the U.S. 
National Intelligence Council that considers a broad range of alternative possibilities for 
the future, and draws on a wide range of disciplines and interest. Some include 
psychology, politics, demographics, and economics to describe what is possible by 
looking at low-probability but high-consequence events to help with accounting for the 
unpredictability of real life. Scenario planning looks to drivers, such as technology or 
socio-economic factors; drivers that could change the way the world works. The result of 
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a scenario analysis is a group of plausible although discrete futures to propose a 
challenging way going forward. 
Royal Dutch/Shell, as well as Pierre Wack, may have pioneered scenario planning 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Afterwards, other corporations followed suit, including 
Motorola, Accenture, and Disney.184 This rapid growth can be attributed to widespread 
dissatisfaction with frameworks for planning, as organizations recognized the error of 
adopting previous models. On a corporate level, Shell had a contingency plan in 1973, 
and was one of the first corporations to understand the potential of scenario planning. The 
9/11 attacks are a shorthand for the public psyche’s greater uncertainty about the 21st 
century threat landscape.  
These events only increased the appeal of scenario planning. For instance, 
scenario planning was used by only 40 percent of companies, but by 2006, the number 
had risen to 70 percent.185 Also, the New York Board of Trade resolved in 1993, after 
scenario planning, that somewhere other than the World Trade Center, it would want to 
build a second trading floor. That foresight made a difference in the continuity of 
operations after 9/11, and was the major impetus to create a third trading floor.186  
Van der Heijden, in his book, Scenarios, discusses strategic ways for 
organizations to increase capacity by anticipating trends and insights about the world. He 
posits “if the organization can react a little faster than its competitors to environmental 
impulses, seeing dangers and opportunities a little earlier, then it has a preferential 
position in the battle for survival.”187 This understanding is not intuitive, but comes from 
strategic posturing to build resilience by using scenario-based planning, as it “uses a set 
of different but equally plausible futures, as a suitable way to characterize the 
environment and understand the uncertainty.”188  
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This method of dealing with uncertainty becomes more manageable as scenario 
planning provides a strategy to adopt in a wide range of possible futures, giving a glimpse 
into different scenarios completely separate from the others. This key strategic insight is 
the important “what if” question helping to identify unforeseen issues and challenges. 
Some of the advantages of such scenarios are that they strengthen the business 
incubator’s strategic management toolbox, as traditional methods tend to focus on the 
memory, while scenario planning requires vision.  
Responsiveness, flexibility and a competitive advantage require vision, as well as 
memory. David Godschalk’s work on urban resiliency discusses the added value of 
scenarios, “Planners and emergency managers would prepare businesses and financial 
institutions to cope with disasters by describing potential scenarios in which business is 
interrupted following a disaster and enlisting business leaders in private sector mitigation 
programs.”189  
4. Analysis and Application 
Similar to Wack’s foresight, by understanding the potential future environment, 
small business entrepreneurs can anticipate risk, and support decisions about 
preparedness efforts. The economic development agency can better assess cycles within 
supply chain management, and adapt strategically, to these changes and their potential 
effects to provide a more accurate picture for small business entrepreneurs. The business 
incubator model could increase capacity for small business entrepreneurs to discuss 
hypothetical scenarios to see how an incident may impact business depending on the 
different variables proposed. The exercise could be as simple as breaking down the small 
business entrepreneurs present in groups and having them respond to a scenario-based 
event. The added value is that the simulation confronts the complexity of today’s 
business environment.  
At the same time, considering shifts in conceptions, globalization, changing 
demographics, and decentralized networks, the writer projects that the “hat trick” 
approach will gain prominence. All these variables are reshaping the social and cultural 
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context within the operating environment of small business entrepreneurs, and require 
entirely new tools, capacities, and methods.190  
Although scenario planning and SNA have been used by the intelligence and 
military communities and large corporations, the applicability is wide ranging, which 
enables broader strategic thinking for small business entrepreneurs about key driving 
forces, including social, technical, economic, and environmental trends and the potential 
effects, and helps to focus on making better mitigation-based decisions. For instance, 
scenarios might depict parts fitting together and are key in planning for any organization, 
whether federal, state, tribal, or municipal governments. In fact, the statement “all 
disasters are local” is appropriate. Notwithstanding planning, a breakdown is likely to 
take place with much needed unavailable resources that results in chaos among 
stakeholders, and a public that is not attended to effectively.  
The 21st century has brought increasingly unpredictable complex interactions. 
Nevertheless, scenario planning can provide foresight on arising threats, and mitigate 
them before an actual event. The multipurpose functionality can be used under numerous 
disaster situations depending on the geographic area (e.g., East Coast hurricanes vs. West 
Coast earthquakes or wildfires). The ultimate goal is offering insights for small business 
entrepreneurs potentially to shift the paradigm of the emergency management cycle and 
its interaction with risk-based technologies.  
The range of possibilities becomes bound only by the imagination of the 
scenarios, driving small business incubators to enhance capacity of small business 
entrepreneurs. For instance, the hat trick approach could be utilized to plan for 
contingencies including the “what if” question, as well as to increase situational 
awareness of vulnerabilities within a geographic area based on THIRA priorities. All 
these game theory derivatives are practical for small business entrepreneurs because they 
help to create a strategy highlighting the power dynamics and interdependencies involved 
in creating a comprehensive plan. The added value is that it addresses the lack of capacity 
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for disaster relief through best practices that can in turn be added to a mitigation and 
preparedness policy. These tools challenge assumptions while encouraging innovation 
and long-range thinking, which ultimately addresses unforeseen gaps that will aid in 
decreasing the high failure rate of small business entrepreneurs after a disaster.  
The wrap-around services model combines these tools. They relate to complex 
systems and connect critical nodes to usher in an alternative flexible enough to be 
replicated in any town USA while providing a cost-effective and valuable community 
asset for stakeholders. This model offers another opportunity to engage small business 
entrepreneurs leveraging already existing models and resources by empowering, and 
mobilizing support for a more resilient nation. For this model to work, a whole 
community approach of shared commitment to working across different sectors for 
mutual learning and participation must be established. The result could be a 
transformative event as a catalyst to build social capital and empowerment within the 
business community.  
D. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
Humans are never more important to other humans than in a crisis. Simple, 
foundational decisions are critical and have long-lasting impacts. Events, such as the 
Bloomberg Administration’s fatal fumbles during a 2010 snowstorm,191 create lasting 
mistrust in a community until a new story is told about a new response to the next storm. 
The following section addresses the paradox of independence and 
interdependence among the small business community. Since a key feature of 
independent operators is an avoidance of formality, the various response plans need to 
include flexibility as a characteristic to ensure an appropriate response. By definition, a 
disaster is not controlled by policies or predictions. Cedar Rapids, and in isolated 
incidents in the Katrina response, demonstrated the vital need for coordination and the 
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effectiveness that coordination can create. Small businesses not only contribute to the 
overall community resilience, they can marshal and increase the effects of their peers, as 
well as various other community stakeholders.  
1. Stakeholders 
One of the few consistent findings in homeland security is that effective 
collaboration is the foundation of successful prevention. The current literature and 
guidance dealing with resilience has been explored in the context of vulnerable 
populations or supply change management assisting local governments, but lacks a focus 
on small business owners or building capacity through a collaborative decision-making 
framework.  
To build a successful group of stakeholders, the Dictator’s Handbook makes the 
argument that a leaders’ power and longevity is dependent on the balance of power of 
three groups notwithstanding the environment: the interchangeables, the influentials, and 
the essentials. With this framework in mind, the book explains how the term 
“dictatorship” refers to democracies where a powerful elite (“essentials”) control the 
mechanisms of powers (“interchangeables”), and typically, a small batch of 
“influentials.” Meanwhile, in a democracy, in theory the structure is made up of a very 
large number of essentials and a very large number of interchangeables, with the 
“influential” almost as numerous as the “interchangeables.”192 
Figures from the SBA suggest that 27 million small businesses are employing 
nearly 60 million people as of 2010, which comprise a major sector of the national 
economy and originate 64 percent of new jobs between 1993 and 2011.193 The 
entrepreneurial challenge is to break down who makes up each one of the three categories 
of players described in the Dictator’s Handbook. An environmental scan would suggest 
that the three groups break down into similar layers of local, state and federal resources. 
In that case, interchangeables would be comprised of small business entrepreneurs, and 
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community alliances (volunteer organizations active in disaster, community emergency 
response teams, non-profit organizations, etc.). The influentials encompass state level 
resources including policy makers (elected leaders), chambers of commerce, the CWE, 
SBDC, SCORE, etc. The essentials are comprised of federal resources including the 
SBA, DHS/FEMA, EDA, and the insurance industry.  
Under the current power structure, the power is exerted from the top down. The 
paradigm shift is to empower small business entrepreneurs to exert power from the 
bottom up. After identifying the three groups, there are two customer segments, since the 
envisioned model serves both internal and external factions. One group is the businesses 
that would receive the wrap-around services from the incubator. The second group is the 
overarching environment and how those interactions feed into the incubator. Checkland’s 
soft systems methodology194 provides a helpful way to break down stakeholders through 
six taxonomic elements: customers, actors, transformation, worldview, ownership and 
environmental constraints. Also, guidance from the Urban Land Institute Advisory Panels 
is a great way to engage multiple practitioners including emergency managers, urban 
planners, architects, and planners among others. In fact, for over 65 years, the Urban 
Land Institute has provided services and employed strategic advice to communities on 
over 600 advisory services teams. Although the new framework combines federal 
guidance to coordinate and lead the delivery of services in affected jurisdictions, it is not 
intended to place undue burden or requirements on local or state stakeholders.  
Similarly, Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative, from the National 
Academy of Sciences, combines a two-year effort sponsored by one community 
resilience group and eight (federal) government agencies. The report defines resilience 
and gives a snapshot of what that would look like, stating, “Resilience is rooted in the 
local community affected by disasters, it involves a wide variety of stakeholders, 
including the private sector, governments, academic, nonprofit groups-on local, state and 
national scales.”195 Overall, the report provides six recommendations, but the most 
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relevant to the small business incubator model is that “federal, state and local 
governments should support the creation and maintenance of broad-based community 
resilience coalitions at the local and regional levels.”196  
2. Next Steps 
Reese’s small business incubators suggest some essential issues to consider prior 
to implementation:  
• Financial backing is a key consideration, since most incubators will not be 
self-sustaining for at least a decade.197 However, philanthropy and 
public/private partnerships might be a way for long-term sustainability. 
Grants, research, and development funds are additional options. Moreover, 
a unique opportunity exists to put the framework into practice, since as of 
June 2014, President Obama announced the National Disaster Resilience 
Competition is allocating $1 billion to communities that have experienced 
natural disasters. The “Community Development Block Grant Disaster 
Recovery” funds will administer the $1 billion Disaster Relief 
Appropriations Act of 2013, which accounts for $820 available to local 
and state governments that experienced a disaster in 2011–13. The effort is 
one more example of “increasing the nation’s resilience to disasters.”198 
• External expertise uses the information from community asset mapping 
and SNA to encompass private sector, academia, and local experts. For 
instance, the NBEOC can share best practices nationwide through its 
network of local and state BEOC. Also, large corporate retailers can share 
best practices with its smaller counterparts. 
• Training and education materials created become part of an online library 
available to share knowledge and best practices in the field. Preparedness 
training is provided based on areas risk profile. 
• The creation of a best practices catalogue with innovative practices and 
research in the field, to aid jurisdictions select those that fit best for them.  
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Policy guidance dictates that government has three means to intervene in public-
private efforts. Government (through policies) can create partnerships, mandate 
compliance, or offer incentives. The insurance industry and government interaction is 
interesting. The insurance industry has taken a more active role in preparedness and 
mitigation activities by creating initiatives and incentives. In some cases, this partnership 
has reduced deaths and property damage. Sometimes, injuries caused by natural disasters 
are susceptible to amelioration.  
For instance, the Oregon Partnership for Disaster Resilience (OPDR) was based 
on the outcomes of a successful program in Rhode Island. The Institute for Business & 
Home Safety had administered that program. An Executive Order was signed in late 2000 
to make Oregon a “showcase state for natural disaster risk reduction.” OPDR uses the 
NFPA 1600 as a benchmark when considering economic resilience designs.  
Their fundamental vision is building on the concept of resilience by ensuring that 
all Oregon communities adapt when confronted with crisis and disasters. The engagement 
takes place through a partner network to prepare or mitigate disasters through long- and 
short-term strategies that include the private sector and business continuity planning. 
However, one of the key features in recovery planning embraced by the OPDR is the 
holistic approach that features responsibility-sharing between individuals, private 
industries, and state, municipal, and federal governments.  
Furthermore, at the World Economic Forum, “Leveraging Growth for Equitable 
Progress” East Asia Conference, Adam Garrard, CEO of Willis Asia in Singapore, 
discussed how a community-based insurance plan enables recovery by paying members 
as resilient targets are completed.199 This innovative approach was introduced by the 
insurance industry after many small businesses were unable to operate due to Typhoon 
Haiyan. At peak density, the typhoon had sustained winds of 195 mph/170 knots with 
                                                 
199 Brown, Designing Solutions for Climate and Resource Risk.  
 83 
gust to 235 mph/205 knots. Its damaged or swept away more than a million homes with a 
death toll of more than 6,300 people.200  
4. Unknowns 
In disaster preparation, as in business planning, understanding relevant processes 
is most helpful before making a decision. Convening a seminar with the stakeholders 
identified from the Task Force what works needs to be done. Competitive advantages to 
existing businesses are important to identify; also, how government involvement can help 
or hinder the maximization of new opportunities. Once a baseline understanding exists, a 
workshop presentation reviews the plan and scope of work with key partners. Figuring 
out how to gather the feedback from small business entrepreneurs and loop back to 
incorporate into the framework so that their needs are met leads to the importance of 
future research. 
5. Future Research  
A feasibility study is suggested to assess the market for the model, financial 
considerations, community buy-in, and additional resources. Based on that information, a 
pilot phase requires at least a year. This phase will collect sufficient data as to whether 
the model is helpful, whether the project is creating extra work without tangible benefits, 
whether a mutual learning experience is involved, and whether the arranged scope of 
services is appropriate to the needs of small business owners, who are vital members of 
the community. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. DISCUSSION—CHALLENGES AND AREAS OF CONTENTION 
The literature review highlighted the current state of affairs, cross-governmental 
evolution, and system adaptation to address the growing narrative to enhance the nation’s 
“resilience” through the goals of PPD-8. Considerable federal guidance, philanthropic 
and state and local efforts working in silos is available to mitigate the effects of disasters 
in communities.  
Yet, with the current declining budgets and competition for resources, small 
business entrepreneurs (and the communities upon whom they depend) who pivot to 
more risk-based systems have a better situational awareness of their vulnerabilities and 
assets. This awareness over-determines their capacities for resilience. It is not a question 
of “if” a disaster strikes.  
This thesis posits that a wrap-around services model is applicable as another tool 
in the growing resilience posture. Using this writer’s hat trick approach (community asset 
mapping, social network analysis and scenario planning) can enhance planning and 
mitigation while building greater partnerships across a broad group of stakeholders. The 
goal, of course, is a more effective recovery thanks to the creation of community 
resilience. The method is a ground up approach taking into consideration social capital, 
resources, and a proactive, data-driven pro-planning stance for a more holistic approach 
to disaster resilience in pre- and post-environments. This added functionality relates 
directly to guidance from the National Mitigation Framework applying planning while 
embedding risk assessments to identify vulnerabilities, applying resources and 
considering economic factors and surrounding health, social services, natural and cultural 
capital systems.  
The hard-earned wisdom that “all disasters are local” is at the heart of this thesis. 
This writer has observed some disaster effects, and recommends increasing whatever 
impetus exists to find ways to make capacity building easier while utilizing local 
resources.  
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In the recovery phase, product procurement can be augmented following guidance 
from the NBEOC (from lessons learned both during Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy). 
Tapping into the local economy, vendors and local chambers of commerce provides 
resources “from the ground up” by defining the “ground” as the existing commercial 
environment and ensuring their involvement. The culture chapter examined some of the 
underlying conditions that might be attributed to processes or may impede small business 
entrepreneurs’ viable options.  
Corporations have embedded proactive analysis as a strategy to mitigate risk. For 
instance, damages due to natural disasters can be easily insured against, or electrical 
failures can be mitigated by redundant backup generators. Losses due to lack of 
preparedness are harder to identify and can result in costly downtime for the business, as 
well as loss of customer activity, and in the worst cases, closure. Still, preparedness 
places planning as an individual responsibility is mostly expressed by the 72 hours of 
self-sufficiency expected by FEMA.  
B. POTENTIAL AREAS OF FURTHER INQUIRY AND RESEARCH  
As the concept of resiliency expands into the marketplace of ideas, further inquiry 
on marketing and branding for small business entrepreneurs is needed since the current 
space lacks significant data. Although the literature suggests a large body of research for 
larger firms, tailored programs for small business entrepreneurs await future 
implementation. Through analysis of different aspects of homeland security, a model was 
advanced and the following recommendations will aid towards those efforts: 
1. Recommendation 1 
A feasibility study would determine whether the wrap-around services model 
makes sense. The areas that would be further examined would be organizational, 
technical, and financial issues involved in the process. For instance, since the Stafford 
Act (42 USC §§ 5121 et. seq.) governs how the nation responds to disasters and 
emergencies, several sections are pertinent to the model and could perhaps be used for 
funding including the following sections. 
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• § 307 “Local Firms,” this section states in part that local firms would be 
provided priority. § 315 “Availability of Materials” is relevant due to 
supply chain management considerations—§§ 307 and 315 could be 
utilized to strengthen local economies and build upon highly successful 
“buy local” efforts nationwide by ensuring contracts or agreements with 
local private entities, and prioritizing a bottom up approach that benefits 
local efforts. The establishment of agreements with local food chains 
necessitates identifying vendors to supply equipment, consumable 
supplies, and related support. In most jurisdictions, these efforts are in 
tandem with the state agency in charge of commerce/economic 
development to provide local support. Also, the coordination of the web 
emergency operations center can aid in the prioritization of resources at 
the state level while communicating with the federal level through 
VBEOC. Nevertheless, exclusion and/or policies that diminish 
competition should be carefully assessed. 
• § 629 “Minority Emergency Preparedness Development Program”—fits 
nicely with local efforts to increase minority participation in minority 
business enterprises, women and minority business enterprise programs, as 
well as encompassing services provided by the SBA resource partners 
(SBDC, CWE & SCORE). The whole community is comprised of a very 
diverse group, and similar to small business entrepreneurs, an involvement 
of partners needs to continue, such as local chambers of commerce, ethnic 
chambers and/or coalitions, such as the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, 
African Alliance, Hmong business groups enhancing partnerships with 
non-traditional stakeholders, and government agencies at the state level to 
integrate preparedness and mitigation planning efforts better. A strategy 
that takes into consideration the needs, as well as the assets of the whole 
community when mapping, can highlight strengths in the different 
networks. For instance, the integration of small business owners in certain 
areas that speak the same language can help improve overall 
communication and resource allocation in an emergency while complying 
with language from the Act. Furthermore, (NPS) Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security (CHDS) program and academic institutions are 
actively studying preparedness and can help in enhancing this model or 
creating similar structures to help inform operational and strategic 
planning.  
2. Recommendation 2 
Online tools—As of the writing of this thesis, a program from Broadband Rhode 
Island was putting together an Online Business Incubator aimed at providing an online 
resource for urban entrepreneurs to succeed with three specific goals: (1) growing 
businesses, (2) mentors and tools, and (3) online feature with a flexible and scalable 
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model.201 These areas build the capacity of the neophyte (or overwhelmed) entrepreneur 
in specific business content from financial planning, marketing, operations, to resources 
and a supportive structure linking small business entrepreneurs to more established 
business sectors. The preparedness and mitigation pieces are the features that would be 
added to the curriculum for the state’s economic development agency to have a more 
comprehensive approach. However, curriculum development would have to be created 
and due to its complicated nature, it is beyond the scope of this research. Nevertheless, 
the aim is to add a cost-effective, workable model to the disaster resilience discussion.  
Additionally, to the extent that disasters and mitigation can be modeled by 
computers, part of a public awareness campaign can include some simulations and 
dramatizations. Local schools of engineering can create models and landscapes for 
scenario meetings while marketing programs can assist in creating slogans and 
informational campaigns.  
3. Recommendation 3 
The creation of a unique subcommittee that tasks chambers of commerce, 
emergency management, planning and state actors to conduct a capability and asset 
assessment is recommended. Capability levels are dynamic, and the working group 
should plan to conduct future capability assessments and gap analyses, so that progress 
can be measured over time to improve the understanding of capabilities.  
The subcommittee would be structured at the state level under the leadership of 
the economic development body and/or a government entity that has linkages to 
municipal and federal agencies. The main goal would be to evaluate how this public 
private partnership is able to address small business failure and create resilience by 
quicker restoration of any given business’ operational capacity. The policy changes 
advanced would be incorporated into existing DHS literature, and as part of a broader 
outreach marketing campaign and with each assessment, more detailed information and 
data that incorporates more partners from the whole community. 
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C. CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS  
The author began the thesis with the simple aim to “move the needle”202 on the 
high number of small business owners failing due to a lack of post-disaster resilience. 
Even a small fluctuation in results can motivate and mobilize local, state, and federal 
entities to make changes to disaster policy. However, circularity seems to occur where 
government is biased toward large businesses because it favors traditional settings. Large 
businesses also enjoy access to government policy makers in ways that small businesses 
do not. The intrinsic value, or foundational assumption, or central principle of the 
national interest in helping small businesses grow, at any and all times when intersecting 
with government policy, seems self-evident.  
Therefore, a conversation will continue among homeland security practitioners, 
community stakeholders, and local, state and federal resources on how small business 
owners can contribute to disaster resilience. The tools explored through the hat trick 
approach can be added to proactive mitigation efforts while combining preparedness for 
practitioners and entities. Nevertheless, funding mechanisms will continue to be a 
challenge.  
The writer had a notion that the findings would be a process (as opposed to a 
product). He also anticipated some non-linear and/or counterintuitive elements since the 
topic involves many stakeholders, and complexity. Of course, some questions will remain 
for any community to exercise its own rights of self-determination in answering. 
• What is the acceptable level of risk for any given community?  
• What is the reasonable return on investment to expect for security 
measures to mitigate any given risk? 
• What is the acceptable number of business failures a community can 
absorb? 
                                                 
202 And to move that needle “in the right direction.” 
 90 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 91 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Ames, Michael. “Small Business Management.” VETBIZ Resource Center. Accessed 
March 2013. http://www.vetbizresourcecenter.com/transition/Why_Small_Busi 
nesses_Fail.html. 
Arup. City Resilience Framework. New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 2014. 
Ayyub, Bilal M., Gerald Galloway, and Angela Bernstein. Developing Infrastructure & 
Community Resilience to Natural & Human-Caused Disasters: Shaping a Path to 
the Future. College Park, MD: University of Maryland, 2013. 
Bandura, Albert. Self-Efficacy. Encyclopedia of Human Behavior. vol. 4. Edited by V. S. 
Ramachaudran, 1994. 
Beatley, Timothy. Planning for Coastal Resilience: Best Practices for Calamitous Times. 
Washington, DC: Island Press, 2006. 
Bellavita, Christopher. “Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland Security?.” 
Homeland Security Affairs 4, no. 1 (2008). 
Blanchard, B. Wayne. “Theory, Principles and Fundamentals of Hazards, Disasters and 
U. S. Emergency Management. Draft Sessions 1 and 4.” Online Project Course, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency Higher Education, 2002. 
Blank, Steve. “No Plan Survives First Contact with Customers—Business Plans Versus 
Business Models.” steveblank.com. April 8, 2010. http://steveblank.com/2010/04/ 
08/no-plan-survives-first-contact-with-customers-%E2%80%93-business-plans-
versus-business-models/.  
Boin, Arjen. “Disaster Research and Future Crises: Broadening the Research Agenda.” 
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 23, no. 3 (2005): 199–
214. 
Brown, Anna. Designing Solutions for Climate and Resource Risk. New York: The 
Rockefeller Foundation, 2014. 
Cabinet Office. “Improving the UK’s Ability to Absorb, Respond to and Recover from 
Emergencies.” Gov.UK. Last modified February 20, 2013. https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/policies/improving-the-uks-ability-to-absorb-respond-to-and-recover-
from-emergencies#background. 
———. “Keeping the Country Running Natural Hazards and Infrastructure.” Gov.UK. 
Last modified October 21, 2011. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ 
keeping-the-country-running-natural-hazards-and-infrastructure. 
 92 
———. “Resilience in Society: Infrastructure, Communities and Businesses: How 
Networks and Individuals Can Support the Country’s Emergency Planning, 
Response and Recovery, and Keep Systems and Services Running.” Gov.UK. 
Last modified February 20, 2013. https://www.gov.uk/resilience-in-society-
infrastructure-communities-and-businesses.  
———. “Risk Assessment: How the Risk of Emergencies in the UK Is Assessed.” 
February 20, 2013. https://www.gov.uk/risk-assessment-how-the-risk-of-
emergencies-in-the-uk-is-assessed. 
———. The Role of Local Resilience Forums: A Reference Document. London: Civil 
Contingencies Secretariat, 2013. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62277/The_role_of_Local_Resilience_Foru
ms-_A_reference_document_v2_July_2013.pdf.  
Cedar Rapids Area Chamber of Commerce, The. First Business Case Management 
Program for A Natural Disaster, Iowa. Cedar Rapids, IA: The Cedar Rapids Area 
Chamber of Commerce, 2012. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “Deaths Associated with Hurricane Sandy—
October–November 2012.” Accessed October 4, 2013. http://www.cdc.gov/ 
mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6220a1.htm?s_cid=mm6220a1_w#fig.  
Chang, Stephanie E. “Disasters and Transport Systems: Loss, Recovery, and Competition 
at the Port of Kobe after the 1995 Earthquake.” Journal of Transport Geography 
8, no. 1 (2000): 53–65. 
Chang, Stephanie E., and Rose, Adam Z. “Towards a Theory of Economic Recovery 
from Disasters.” Paper 203. Published Articles & Papers, 2012. http://research 
.create.usc.edu/published_papers/203. 
Childs, Donna R. Prepare for the Worst, Plan for the Best: Disaster Preparedness and 
Recovery for Small Businesses. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008. 
Cline, Seth. “A Decade Later, Nightclub Fire Lives on: No Nightclub Blaze Rivaling the 
Station Fire has Occurred in the United States since.” US World News, February 
20, 2013, sec. Press Past. 
Cohan, Peter. “Harvard’s Lion of Entrepreneurship Packs Up His Office.” Forbes. 
Accessed September 15, 2013. http://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/ 
2011/06/15/harvards-lion-of-entrepreneurship-packs-up-his-office/. 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. Disaster 
Recovery: Past Experience of America’s Small Business in Rebuilding Their 
Communities. (GAO-08-1120). Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2008.  
 93 
Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives. An Assessment of the Post-
Katrina Emergency Management. Washington, DC: Printing Office, 2011. 
Committee on Increasing National Resilience to Hazards and Disasters, Committee on 
Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, and The National Academies. Disaster 
Resilience: A National Imperative. Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 
2012. 
Committee on Increasing National Resilience to Hazards and Disasters; Committee on 
Science, Engineering, and Public Policy (COSEPUP); Policy and Global Affairs 
(PGA); and the National Academies. Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative. 
Washington, DC: The National Academies, 2012. 
Committee on Private-Public Sector Collaboration to Enhance Community Disaster 
Resilience, Geographic Science Committee, National Research Council. Building 
Community Disaster Resilience through Private-Public Collaboration. 
Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2011.  
Corey, Christy, and Elizabeth Deitch. “Factors Affecting Business Recovery Immediately 
after Hurricane Katrina.” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 19, 
no. 3 (2011): 169–181. 
Cutter, Susan. “Temporal and Spatial Changes to Social Vulnerability to Natural 
Hazards.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105, no. 7 (2008): 
2301–2306. 
Cutter, Susan, and Mary L. Zoback. “Improving the Nation’s Resilience to Disasters.” 
Eos, Transactions American Geophysical Union 94, no. 9 (2014): 85–89. 
Cutter, Susan, Christopher G. Burton, and Christopher T. Emrich. “Disaster Resilience 
Indicators for Benchmarking Baseline Conditions.” Journal of Homeland Security 
and Emergency Management 7, no. 1, art. 51 (2010). 
De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, and Alastair Smith. The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad 
Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics. New York: PublicAffairs, 2011. Kindle 
edition.  
Dees, J. Gregory. “The Meaning of Social Entrepreneurship.” The Kauffman Center for 
Entrepreneurial Leadership. Accessed November 16, 2014. http://www.partner 
ships.org.au/Library/the_meaning_of_social_entrepreneurship.htm. 
Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security Policy Directive/HSPD-8, 
National Preparedness. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
2003. 
 94 
Department of Housing and Urban Development. “National Disaster Resilience 
Competition.” Accessed September 2014. https://www.hudexchange.info/ 
programs/cdbg-dr/resilient-recovery/. 
Donella, Meadows. Thinking in Systems: A Primer. White River Junction, VT: Chelsea 
Green Publishing, 2008, Kindle edition. 
Dorner, Dietrich. The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Error in Complex 
Situations. New York: Basic Books, 1997. Kindle edition.  
Eggers, William D., and John O’Leary. If We Can Put a Man on the Moon: Getting Big 
Things Done in Government. Boston: Harvard Business Review Press, 2009. 
Kindle edition. 
Egli, Dane S. “Beyond the Storms: Strengthening Preparedeness, Response, & Resilience 
in the 21st Century.” Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 2 (2013): 32–45. 
Escudier, Blake O. “Louisiana Small Business Owner Stated Problems during Recovery 
from Hurricane Katrina: Outsider Assistance within a Dynamic Environment.” 
Ph.D. diss., Cappella University, 2009. 
Everton, Sean F. Disrupting Dark Networks (Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences). 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Kindle edition. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Five New Orleans Police Officers Sentenced on Civil 
Rights and Obstruction of Justice Violations in the Danziger Bridge Shooting 
Case.” April 4, 2012. https://www.fbi.gov/neworleans/press-releases/2012/five-
new-orleans-police-officers-sentenced-on-civil-rights-and-obstruction-of-justice-
violations-in-the-danziger-bridge-shooting-case. 
Federal Emergency Management Agency. “Business Continuity Plan.” Accessed January 
31, 2014. http://www.ready.gov/business/implementation/continuity. 
———. “Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.” Department of Homeland Security. Accessed 
February 15, 2014. http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/4596. 
———. “Disaster Search Database.” Accessed August 31, 2013. http://www.fema.gov/ 
disasters?action=Reset. 
———. “Mission Areas.” Last updated October 2, 2015. http://www.fema.gov/mission-
areas. 
———. “National Business Emergency Operations Center Fact Sheet.” Accessed August 
24, 2013. http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/28983?id=6437. 
 95 
———. National Mitigation Framework. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, 2013. http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-25045-
9956/final_national_mitigation_framework_20130501.pdf. 
———. “Protecting Your Business.” Department of Homeland Security. Last updated 
June 15, 2015. http://www.fema.gov/protecting-your-businesses. 
———. Strategic Foresight Initiative. Crisis Response and Disaster Resilience 2030: 
Forging Strategic Action in an Age of Uncertainty. Washington, DC: Department 
of Homeland Security, 2012.  
———. Threat Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment. Comprehensive 
Preparedness Guide 201. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, 2013. http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/8ca0a9e54dc8b037a55 
b402b2a269e94/CPG201_htirag_2nd_edition.pdf. 
———. “What Is Mitigation?” Department of Homeland Security. Accessed April 15, 
2014. https://www.fema.gov/what-mitigation. 
Forbes, Nathaniel. “Contingency Planning for Earthquakes in Asia.” Journal of Business 
Continuity & Emergency Management 3, no. 4 (July 2009): 356–367. 
Freiman, Stuart. “BBRI Online Business Incubator Program.” Broadband Rhode Island. 
Accessed May 2014. http://broadband.ri.gov/OurPrograms/OnlineBusinessIncu 
bator/tabid/192/Default.aspx. 
Furman, Phyllis. “Hurricane Sandy, One Year Later: Businesses Struggle to Survive.” 
New York Daily News, 2013. 
Gaskill, LuAnn Ricketts, Howard E. Van Auken, and Ronald A. Manning. “A Factor 
Analytic Study of the Perceived Causes of Small Business Failure.” Journal of 
Small Business Management 31, no. 4 (October 1993): 18–31. 
Godschalk, David. “Urban Hazard Mitigation: Creating Resilient Cities.” Natural 
Hazards Review 4, no. 3 (August 2004): 136–142. 
Hahn, Daniel. “How to Create a Public-Private Partnership: A Replicable Project 
Associated with Business Continuity.” Journal of Business Continuity & 
Emergency Planning 4, no. 3 (July 8, 2010): 274–285. 
Hecht, Jared. “Are Small Businesses really the Backbone of the Economy?” Inc.Com 
(December 17, 2014). 
Hilary Inyang, Terezinha Cassia de Brito Galvão, and David Young. “Integrating Hazard 
Control into Sustainable Development Plans.” Natural Hazards Review 4, no. 2 
(2003): 57–58. 
 96 
Himayatullah, Khan, Laura Giurca Vasilescu, and Khan Asmatullah. “Disaster 
Management Cycle—A Theoretical Approach.” Management and Marketing 
Journal 6, no. 1 (2008): 43–50. 
Hindle, Tim. The Economist Guide to Management Ideas and Gurus. Hoboken, NJ: 
Bloomberg Press, 2008. 
Homeland Security. “Plan and Prepare for Disasters.” Accessed February 22, 2014. 
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/plan-and-prepare-disasters. 
Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force. Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy: Stronger 
Communities, A Resilient Region. Washington, DC: Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, 2013. http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc? 
id=HSRebuildingStrategy.pdf. 
International Business Innovation Association, The. “What is Business Incubation.” 
Accessed August 30, 2014. http://www.nbia.org/resource_library/what_is/ 
index.php. 
Keats, Barbara W., and Jeffrey S. Bracker. “Toward a Theory of Small Firm 
Performance: A Conceptual Model.” American Journal of Small Business 12 
(1988): 41–58.  
Keehner Rigas, Laura. National Advisory a Retrospective: BENS’ Impact on 
Public/Private Partnerships. Washington, DC: Business Executives for National 
Security, 2011. 
Kerzner, Harold. Strategic Planning for Project Management Using a Project 
Management Maturity Model. New York: Wiley, 2001. 
Kretzmann, John, and John McKnight. Building Communities from the Inside Out: A 
Path toward Finding and Mobilizing a Community’s Assets. Evanston, IL: The 
Asset-Based Community Development Institute, Institute for Policy Research, 
Northwestern University, 1993.  
Kroll, Cynthia A., John D. Landis, Qing Shen, and Sean Stryker. Economic Impacts of 
the Loma Prieta Earthquake: A Focus on Small Businesses. Working Paper 91–
187. Berkeley, CA: U.C. Transportation Center and the Center for Real Estate and 
Urban Economics, University of California at Berkeley, 1991. 
Kunreuther, Howard, and Michel-Kerjan Erwann. “Challenge Paper: Natural Disasters.” 
Center for Risk Management and Decision Processes The Wharton School, 
University of Pennsylvania, April 12, 2012. http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/ 
library/CopenhagenConsenus2012_NaturalDistasters.pdf. 
 97 
Lada, Brian. “Remembering Haiyan One Year after Landfall.” AccuWeather.com. 
Accessed October 10, 2014. http://www.accuweather.com/en/weather-news/ 
remembering-haiyan-one-year-af/37030167. 
Lahey, Kate, and Booth, Joey. “Lessons from Louisiana, and a New Normal in 
Disasters.” Australian Journal of Emergency Management 29, no. 2 (2014): 53–
56. 
Lam, Nina S. N., Kelley Pace, Richard Campanella, James LeSage, and Helbert Arenas. 
“Business Return in New Orleans: Decision Making Amid Post-Katrina 
Uncertainty.” PLoS ONE 4, no. 8 (August 26, 2009): e6765. doi:10.1371/journal. 
pone.0006765. 
Lindell, Michael K., Ronald W. Perry, and Carla Prater. Introduction to Emergency 
Management. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2007. 
Longstaff, Patricia H. “Building Resilient Communities: A Preliminary Framework for 
Assessment.” Homeland Security Affairs 6, issue 3 (September 2010). 
Lupo, Mark R. “Challenging the Why of Small Business Preparedness.” Disaster 
Recovery Journal 27, no. 4 (2014). 
Magsino, Sammantha L., and National Research Council. Applications of Social Network 
Analysis for Building Community Disaster Resilience: Workshop Summary. 
Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2009. 
McKay, Jim. “Chief Resilience Officers: Coming to Your City? Chief Resilience Officers 
Begin to Guide Cities Toward a Future that’s Better Prepared for Physical, Social 
and Economic Challenges.” Emergency Management, September 12, 2014. 
McLeod, Saul. “Attribution Theory.” Simply Psychology. 2010. http://www.simply 
psychology.org/attribution-theory.html. 
———. “Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs.” Simply Psychology, 2007. http://www.simpl 
ypsychology.org/maslow.html. 
Mcshane, Larry. “Blizzard of 2010: Forecast Were Fuzzy, Buses Were Bungled, Plows 
Were Pathetic & Mayor Was Missing.” New York Daily News, December 30, 
2010. http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/blizzard-2010-forecasts-fuzzy-
buses-bungled-plows-pathetic-mayor-missing-article-1.475326. 
Menzel Baker, Stacey. “Vulnerability and Resilience in Natural Disasters: A Marketing 
and Public Policy Perspective.” Journal of Public Policy and Marketing 28, no. 1 
(2009): 114–123. 
Morag, Nadav. Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons (Wiley Series on 
Homeland Defense and Security). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2012, Kindle edition. 
 98 
Mullen, Corina. “Business Planning for Disaster Survival.” Chamber101.com. Accessed 
August 24, 2013. http://www.chamber101.com/2programs_committee/natural_ 
disasters/disasterpreparedness/Forty.htm. 
National Business Incubation Association, The. “Business Incubation FAQs.” Accessed 
September 2014. http://www.nbia.org/resources/business-incubation-faq. 
National Fire Protection Academy. NFPA 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency 
Management and Business Continuity Programs. 2013 ed. Quincy, MA: National 
Fire Protection Academy, 2013. 
National Research Council. Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness and 
Response in the United States. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 
2001.  
Natural Hazards Center. Holistic Disaster Recovery, Ideas for Building Local 
Sustainability after a Natural Disaster. Boulder, CO: University of Colorado, 
2001. 
NetMBA. “Scenario Planning.” Accessed September 2014. http://www.netmba.com/ 
strategy/scenario/. 
Ostrom, Elinor. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2005.  
Pan, Qisheng. “Economic Losses from a Hypothetical Hurricane Event in the Houston-
Galveston Area.” Natural Hazards Review 12, no. 3 (2010): 146–155. 
Paton, Douglas, and David Johnston. Disaster Resilience: An Integrated Approach. 
Springfield, IL: CC Thomas, 2006. 
Perry, Ronald W., and Michael K. Lindell. “Preparedness for Emergency Response: 
Guidelines for the Emergency Planning Process.” Disasters 27, no. 4 (2003): 
336–350. 
Perry, Stephen C. “The Relationship between Written Plans and the Failure of Small 
Business.” Journal of Small Business Management 39, no. 3 (2001): 201–208. 
Phelps, Regina. “Lessons Learned from Hurricane Sandy.” Disaster Resource Guide, 
2014.  
Reese, Laura A. “Small Business Incubators.” Municipal Economic Development 
Toolkit. 2008. www.Municipaltoolkit.Org. 
Ressler, Steve. “Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism: Past, 
Present and Future Research.” Homeland Security Affairs II, no. 2 (July 2, 2006). 
http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=2.2.8. 
 99 
Ries, Eric. “Introduction.” In The Lean Startup: How Today's Entrepreneurs Use 
Continuous Innovation to Create Radically Successful Businesses. 1–11. 1st 
edition ed. New York: Crown Business New York, 2014.  
———. “Welcome to the Success Factory.” Management Today. April 1, 2012. http:// 
www.managementtoday.co.uk/features/1124092/welcome-success-factory. 
Rigby, Darrell. “The Next Best Thing to a Crystal Ball.” Forbes, 2007. 
Robert, Edson. Systems Thinking. Applied. A Primer. Arlington, VA: ASysT Institute, 
2008. 
Rogoff, Edward G., Myung-Soo Lee, and Dong-Churl Suh. ““Who Done It?” 
Attributions by Entrepreneurs and Experts of the Factors that Cause and Impede 
Small Business Success.” Journal of Small Business Management 42, no. 4 
(October 2004): 364–376. 
Rubin, Claire B. “Report on Reports: Review of Disaster Resilience: A National 
Imperative.” Environment Magazine, March–April 2013. 
Runyan, Rodney C. “Small Business in the Face of Crisis: Identifying Barriers to 
Recovery from a Natural Disaster.” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management 14, no. 1 (2006): 12–26. 
Santa Cruz Public Library. “Remembering the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake.” 1989. 
http://www2.santacruzpl.org/gallery2/v/1989quake/rs007.jpg.html and http:// 
www2.santacruzpl.org/gallery2/v/1989quake/Pw-016.jpg.html.  
SBA Office of Advocacy. “Brochure.” 2013. http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/ 
files/WEB_11_Advo_Brochure.pdf. 
———. “Frequently Asked Questions.” September 2012. http://www.sba.gov/sites/ 
default/files/FAQ_Sept_2012.pdf. 
———. “Frequently Asked Questions about Small Business Finance.” September 2011. 
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/Finance%20FAQ%208-25-11%20 
FINAL%20for%20web.pdf.  
SBA Research and Statistics. “The Small Business Economy 2012, Appendix A.” 2012. 
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/Appendix_A_2012.xls. 
Schrank, Holly L., Maria I. Marshall, Adrienne Hall-phillips, Renee F. Wiatt, and Nicole 
E. Jones. “Small-Business Demise and Recovery after Katrina: Rate of Survival 
and Demise.” Natural Hazards 65, no. 3 (February 2013): 2353–2374. 
 100 
Sean Wilson, Bethany Temple, Mark Milliron, Calixto Vazquez, Michael Packard, and 
Bruce Rudy. “The Lack of Disaster Preparedness by the Public and it’s Affect on 
Communities.” The Internet Journal of Rescue and Disaster Medicine 7, no. 2 
(2007). http://ispub.com/IJRDM/7/2/11721. 
Sligh, Albert. Disaster Recovery: Evaluating the Role of America’s Small Business in 
Rebuilding Their Communities. Washington, DC: Senate Hearing 112-722, 2011.  
Smith, Daniel J., and Daniel Sutter. “Response and Recovery after the Joplin Tornado: 
Lessons Applied and Lessons Learned.” Social Science Research Network, 2013. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2261353. 
SPUR. “On Solid Ground, How Good Land Use Planning Can Prepare the Bay Area for a 
Strong Disaster Recovery.” February 2013. http://www.spur.org/sites/default/ 
files/publications_pdfs/SPUR_On_Solid_Ground.pdf. 
White House, The. “Presidential Policy Directive-8, National Preparedness.” Accessed 
October 8, 2014. http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1215444247124.shtm. 
———. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington, 
DC: The White House, 2006. 
Tjan, Anthony. “Vulnerability: The Defining Trait of Great Entrepreneurs.” Harvard 
Business Review, October 6, 2009. 
U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development. Natural Disasters and Sustainable 
Development: Understanding the Links between Development, Environment and 
Natural Disasters. New York: U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development, 
2002. 
U.S. Economic Development Administration. Resilience in Economic Development 
Planning: Colorado Flooding: DR 4145. Washington, DC: U.S. Economic 
Development Administration, 2014.  
UCLA Center for Health Policy Research. Asset Mapping. Los Angeles, CA: UCLA 
Center for Health Policy Research, n.d. http://healthpolicy.ucla.edu/programs/ 
health-data/trainings/Documents/tw_cba20.pdf. 
Van der Heijden, Kees. Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation. Hoboken, NJ: 
Wiley, 2011. Kindle edition. 
Waugh, William, and Kathleen J. Tierney. Emergency Management: Principles and 
Practice for Local Government. Washington, DC: International City and County 
Management Association, 2007. 
 101 
Webb, Gary R., Kathleen J. Tierney, and James M. Dahlhamer. “Business and Disasters: 
Empirical Patterns and Unanswered Questions.” Natural Hazards Review 1, no. 2 
(2000): 83–90. 
———. “Predicting Long-Term Business Recovery from Disasters: A Comparison of the 
Loma Prieta Earthquake and Hurricane Andrew.” Environmental Hazards no. 4 
(2002): 45–58. 
Wilkinson, Angela, and Roland Kupers. “Living in the Futures.” Harvard Business 
Review 91, no. 5 (2013): 118–27.  
Xinhua, Ban Wei. “Study Shows Dramatic Rise in Natural Disasters over Past Decade.” 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
  
 103 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
